About the Authors

Captain Christopher H. Sharman, USN (Ret.) has served as the Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute since October 2023. He comes to CMSI following a 30-year active-duty Navy career that included diplomatic postings at U.S. Embassies in both China and Vietnam and multiple operational afloat assignments with the Japan-based Forward Deployed Naval Forces. His afloat assignments included tours aboard the USS Independence (CV 62), with the Strike Group Staff embarked aboard USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), and with the Seventh Fleet Staff embarked aboard the USS Blue Ridge (LCC 19). He also served as a National Security Affairs Fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. His military career culminated with his assignment to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Senior Strategist for the National Intelligence Manager for East Asia with responsibilities for synchronizing the Intelligence Community’s China efforts. He has written numerous articles for various journals, is a frequent podcast guest, and published a monograph through the Institute of National Strategic Studies titled, China Moves Out: Stepping Stones Toward a New Maritime Strategy.

Mr. Terry Hess is a U.S. Navy submarine warfare analyst with more than ten years’ experience developing methodologies and assessments of submarine warfare concepts. He is a retired USN Senior Chief Acoustic Intelligence (ACINT) Specialist with multiple years of operations at sea including an overseas assignment in Sydney, Australia. Hess served aboard three fast attack submarines: the USS Richard B. Russell (SSN-687), USS La Jolla (SSN-701), and USS Parche(SSN-683). He has been married for 32 years to Kathryn Hess with three adult children and seven grandchildren living throughout the United States. Hess has a passion for submarine warfare research and novel concepts of capability employment.

Summary

Since 2018, there have been significant changes to People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force training, and these changes have been driven by important revisions to strategic guidance and subsequent directives that focused PLA efforts to enhance its capabilities to operate in the maritime domain. While this guidance is applicable to all services, improving PLAN submarine force capabilities appears to have been of particular interest to senior Chinese leadership. This guidance expanded the PLA’s maritime domain requirements, which demanded that China’s submarine force improve its capabilities to operate independently or along with other PLAN assets at greater distances from coast and in the far seas. This has resulted in submarine training that is more realistic, rigorous, and standardized across the fleet. Though stressful on submarine equipment and crews, these changes to training may ultimately yield a more combat-capable submarine fleet operating throughout the western Pacific.

Introduction

On the afternoon of June 11, 2018, People’s Republic of China (PRC) President and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman, Xi Jinping, climbed through the hatch of a Type 093 (Shang class) submarine moored at Qingdao Submarine Base—his second visit aboard a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) nuclear submarine since assuming his role as CMC Chairman in November 2012. While aboard, he encouraged the crew to “train to excel in the skills for winning.”1 After disembarking, he toured the comprehensive simulation building at the nearby PLAN Northern Theater Command Headquarters, where he learned how simulator improvements helped make submarine training more realistic. His day culminated with a speech to the assembled PLAN leadership, where he stated:

It is necessary to earnestly implement the new generation of military training regulations and military training programs, increase the intensity of training, innovate training modules, and strictly strengthen the supervision of training. It is necessary to launch mass training exercises in the new era, strengthen targeted training, training in actual cases, and training for commanders, and strengthen military struggle for frontline training [sic].2

While Xi could have delivered his remarks to an army unit or issued guidance through a written order from Beijing, his itinerary and comments suggest his visit was deliberately choreographed to convey a strategic focus on training—and that submarine training was of particular interest to the highest levels of PLA leadership.

Xi’s direction to improve training was not new, but a continuation of previous strategic guidance. For instance, the 18th Party Congress work report issued in November 2012 highlighted the need to “revitalize the research style of combat problems and strengthen practical training.”3 Rather, Xi’s June 2018 speech reflects a renewed CMC emphasis on PLA training in order to advance capabilities necessary to address additional operational requirements driven by changes in strategic guidance. This report argues that the PLA began a concerted effort to adopt new tactical and operational concepts to address these requirements starting in 2018 and that these efforts have significant implications for submarine doctrine and how the submarine force trains. … … …

Conclusion

The PLAN submarine force is rapidly adapting to CMC training directives and requirements issued since 2018 to support the changes to the 2014 military strategic guidelines. In alignment with this guidance, submarines are training more regularly under realistic combat conditions for longer durations while operating under informatized conditions at greater distances from the PRC coast. The submarine force is developing innovative tactics, incorporating intelligentization, and progressing toward the capability to conduct integrated joint operations. Commentary by PLA authors, however, suggests integrated joint operations remain aspirational. While the individual services may operate in proximity to each other during large- and small-scale training exercises, coordination at the unit-level appears primarily to be between units within the same service. Meanwhile, as the PLAN integrates new platforms and technologies into its inventory, crews must also become familiar with the new equipment and develop numerous basic skills necessary to operate a submarine safely at sea.

The multitude of training requirements promulgated since 2018 places tremendous stress on both crews and equipment. The physical stress on equipment and mental strain on submarine crews increases the likelihood of an equipment failure or human error that could result in a catastrophic disaster. Ironically, such an incident could undermine CMC confidence in the submarine force’s ability to execute critical missions, jeopardizing the PRC’s prospects for “national rejuvenation”—a likely reason the CMC adjusted its strategic guidelines in 2014 and issued follow-on training guidance starting in 2018.

On the other hand, it has been just five years since the CMC began issuing annual training orders. In this short time, the submarine force has implemented protocols that help to ensure training is similar to combat while crews are ashore, pier side, and at sea. Should the submarine force continue on its current training trajectory and improve its intelligentization by integrating new technologies such as AI and improved tactical communications systems, PLAN submarines will be more capable of executing combat operations throughout the near and far seas and present a more potent threat across the western Pacific.

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David C. Logan, China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent: Organizational, Operational, and Strategic Implications, China Maritime Report 33 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, December 2023).

About the Author

Dr. David C. Logan is Assistant Professor of Security Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His research focuses on nuclear weapons, arms control, deterrence, and the U.S.-China security relationship. He previously taught in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval War College and served as a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow with the MIT Security Studies Program and a Fellow with the Princeton Center for International Security Studies, where he was also Director of the Strategic Education Initiative. Dr. Logan has conducted research for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at National Defense University, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Office of Net Assessment. He has published in International Security, Journal of Strategic Studies, Georgetown University Press, National Defense University Press, Foreign Affairs, Los Angeles Times, and War on the Rocks, among other venues. He holds a B.A. from Grinnell College and an M.P.A., M.A., and Ph.D. from Princeton University.

The author wishes to thank Tom Stefanick, Liza Tobin, CDR Robert C. Watts IV, and the members of the China Maritime Studies Institute for helpful comments on earlier versions of this report.

Summary

China’s development of a credible sea-based deterrent has important implications for the PLAN, for China’s nuclear strategy, and for U.S.-China strategic stability. For the PLAN, the need to protect the SSBN force may divert resources away from other missions; it may also provide justification for further expansion of the PLAN fleet size. For China’s nuclear strategy and operations, the SSBN force may increase operational and bureaucratic pressures for adopting a more forward-leaning nuclear strategy. For U.S.-China strategic stability, the SSBN force will have complex effects, decreasing risks that Chinese decisionmakers confront use-or-lose escalation pressures, making China less susceptible to U.S. nuclear threats and intimidation and therefore perceiving lower costs to conventional aggression, and potentially introducing escalation risks from conventional-nuclear entanglement to the maritime domain.

Introduction

China is undertaking a significant nuclear expansion and modernization. While China’s nuclear warhead stockpile numbered fewer than 300 bombs just a few years ago, the Department of Defense estimates that by 2030 the “the PRC will have about 1,000 operational nuclear warheads, most of which will be fielded on systems capable of ranging the continental United States (CONUS)” and could have as many as 1,500 warheads by 2035.”1 While the changes within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force (PLARF) have received significant attention, the development of a credible fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) will also have important implications for China’s nuclear strategy and operations, the PLA Navy (PLAN), and U.S.-China strategic stability. Given the deterioration of U.S.-China relations, growing competition in the nuclear domain, and the prominence of the maritime domain to any future U.S.-China crisis or conflict, China’s SSBN force will assume greater importance. This report examines these developments and their implications.

China’s development of its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent has several implications for China’s naval force structure and strategy, Chinese nuclear strategy and operations, and U.S.-China strategic stability. For the PLAN, a sea-based nuclear deterrent will likely impose new demands on the rest of the navy by requiring the service to dedicate other forces to the defense of SSBNs and may require the PLAN to develop personnel reliability and warhead handling programs, which could lead to changes from its historically centralized approach to nuclear weapons. For China’s nuclear strategy and operations, the realization of a full nuclear triad may lead the PLA to construct bodies and processes for maintaining real-time awareness of the status of China’s nuclear deterrent, and for targeting coordination and deconfliction among the nuclear capabilities of the PLARF, the Navy and the Air Force. The SSBN force may also require the establishment and empowerment of additional nuclear constituencies within the PLA, which might advocate for a greater role for nuclear weapons in China’s national security strategy, while the operational requirements of an SSBN force may encourage China to reconsider some of its longstanding nuclear weapons practices. Finally, for U.S.-China strategic stability, the development of a credible sea-based deterrent, to the extent it strengthens Chinese decisionmakers’ confidence in the survivability of the country’s nuclear deterrent, may strengthen some forms of crisis stability while weakening others, provide Beijing the option to use its stronger nuclear forces as a shield behind which to initiate conventional aggression, and introduce new forms of inadvertent escalation stemming from conventional-nuclear “entanglement.”

This report draw on a wide-range of sources.2 It prioritize sources traditionally viewed as authoritative, including China’s Defense White Papers, high-level curricular materials published by PLA research institutions, such as the Science of Military Strategy volumes published by the Academy of Military Science and National Defense University, and academic writings published by researchers affiliated with PLA institutions, including both the PLAN Submarine Academy and the Rocket Force Engineering University.3 This report also reviews articles appearing in major Chineselanguage venues, particularly those published by influential think tanks and research centers.4 This report examines military reporting and commentary as well as secondary sources discussing Chinese views of strategic stability. Finally, it draws on U.S. sources, including unclassified U.S. intelligence estimates and public assessments from the Department of Defense, as well as public statements from senior U.S. military officials. One caveat on any open-source analysis of Chinese nuclear views is the limits created by the historical division between China’s strategic community, consisting of researchers and strategists at civilian and PLA-affiliated institutions, and the operator community, consisting of the military professionals in the PLA and, specifically, the missile forces charged with operating the country’s nuclear missiles.5 The views of the strategic community are more accessible than those of operators. However, as of the early 2000s, there were signs of greater interaction between these two communities, including strategists briefing operators, operators pursuing Ph.Ds. at civilian institutions, and participation by operators in Track-1.5 dialogues with American colleagues.6

The report proceeds in five parts. First, it summarizes key features of China’s SSBN force, including recent developments, technical capabilities, and operational practices. Second, it reviews potential implications of the SSBN force for the PLAN, including naval force development and force allocation. Third, it assesses implications for China’s nuclear strategy and operations, including the unique role of the SSBN force within China’s nuclear deterrent and the pressures the force may create for China to change its nuclear operations and strategy. Fourth, it reviews implications of the SSBN force for U.S.-China strategic stability. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of implications for U.S. policy and future research on China’s nuclear forces.

Conclusion

China’s development of a credible sea-based deterrent has important implications for the PLAN, for China’s nuclear strategy, and for U.S.-China strategic stability. For the PLAN, the need to protect the SSBN force may divert resources away from other missions; it may also provide justification for further expansion of the PLAN fleet size.83 For China’s nuclear strategy and operations, the SSBN force may increase operational and bureaucratic pressures for adopting a more forward-leaning nuclear strategy. For U.S.-China strategic stability, the SSBN force will have complex effects, decreasing risks that Chinese decisionmakers confront use-or-lose escalation pressures, making China less susceptible to U.S. nuclear threats and intimidation and therefore perceiving lower costs to conventional aggression, and potentially introducing escalation risks from conventional-nuclear entanglement to the maritime domain.

The findings reported here have important implications for both U.S. policy and for future research on the PLA. First, the U.S. Navy and intelligence community should identify and assess the escalation risks stemming from conventional-nuclear entanglement at sea. U.S. decisionmakers and operational plans must account for these risks. Addressing the risks may require tradeoffs between maximizing conventional advantages and limiting the risks of nuclear use by, for instance, limiting ASW against Chinese SSBNs and supporting capabilities. Second, possible nuclear arms control agreements between China and the United States must account for other legs of the Chinese deterrent. While the current poor state of U.S.-China relations makes near-term arms control unlikely, decision makers can lay the foundation now for future agreements.84 Proposals for U.S.- China arms control have largely focused on China’s land-based missiles.85 However, potential arms control efforts will need to consider how to incorporate the specific challenges of other legs of a Chinese nuclear triad. Third, the U.S. Navy will have to weigh the costs, benefits, and risks of allocating military assets to either the strategic ASW mission targeting Chinese SSBNs or to conventional military operations.86 In a crisis or conflict, tracking or targeting Chinese SSBNs might provide the United States coercive leverage or help support a damage limitation nuclear strategy, but it would reduce the resources available for other missions and might be viewed as an escalatory attempt to undermine China’s strategic deterrent. Finally, China analysts may need to increasingly consider domestic, non-strategic drivers of the country’s nuclear strategy and operations. While China’s nuclear strategy likely remains sensitive to U.S. policy choices, factors rooted in bureaucratic posturing, domestic politics, and international prestige may become increasingly important for Beijing. It may be more challenging for the United States to influence these factors.

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Joshua Arostegui, The PCH191 Modular Long-Range Rocket Launcher: Reshaping the PLA Army’s Role in a Cross-Strait Campaign, China Maritime Report 32 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, November 2023).

About the Author

Joshua Arostegui is the Chair of China Studies and Research Director of the China Landpower Studies Center at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. His primary research topics include Chinese strategic landpower, People’s Liberation Army joint operations, and Indo-Pacific security affairs. Mr. Arostegui previously served as a Department of the Army Senior Intelligence Analyst for China. He is also a Chief Warrant Officer 5 in the U.S. Navy Reserve where he serves as a technical director in the Information Warfare Community. Mr. Arostegui earned a M.A. in International Relations from Salve Regina University and a M.A. in History from the University of Nebraska, Kearney. He is also a graduate of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College Distance Education Program and the Defense Language Institute’s Basic and Intermediate Chinese Courses. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The author would like to thank Dennis Blasko and James McNutt for their insight and recommendations, as well as Ryan Martinson for his editorial review.

Summary

With its fielding of the PCH191 multiple rocket launcher (MRL) and its variety of long-range precision munitions, the PLA Army (PLAA) has become arguably the most important contributor of campaign and tactical firepower during a joint island landing campaign against Taiwan. No longer simply the primary source of amphibious and air assault forces, the PLAA is now capable of using its multiple battalions of PCH191 MRLs to support maritime dominance, the joint firepower strike, and ground forces landing on Taiwan’s shores and in depth. The Chinese ordnance industry has developed multiple low-cost rockets, an anti-ship cruise missile, and a tactical missile to be used with the PCH191, as well as its export variant, the AR3, including munitions that can quickly and precisely strike targets in the Taiwan Strait, across the island, and beyond. Recent demonstrations of the PCH191 during PLA training events and Eastern Theater Command response actions to politically charged visits, in addition to the fielding of new reconnaissance assets capable of providing targeting and battle damage assessments to the MRL, make it clear the Army intends to use the system to achieve effects in a future Taiwan crisis that formerly would have been the responsibility of other PLA services.

Introduction

On August 4, 2022, the Chinese PLA Army (PLAA) used three of its new modular long-range multiple rocket launcher (MRL) systems, the PCH191, in the large joint exercise in response to U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. The PLA dispatched launchers from the 72nd Artillery Brigade, 72nd Group Army, PLA Eastern Theater Command (ETC) Army, to Pingtan Island, Fujian province—the narrowest point in the Taiwan Strait (approximately 150 km from Taoyuan Airport on Taiwan’s western shore). There, each launcher fired an unknown number of rockets into a designated zone that stretched from off China’s coast beyond the median line in the Taiwan Strait.1 Although the rocket launches received some coverage from official People’s Republic of China (PRC) media outlets, the focus remained on the much more provocative PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) missiles fired over Taiwan, as well as the large number of PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) platforms patrolling around the island.

Yet the introduction of the PCH191 should not be overlooked.2 It marks a major advance in the PLAA’s potential contributions to a cross-strait invasion. While the Army traditionally had the lead in landing on the island and seizing key strategic points during a potential Taiwan invasion campaign, China’s primary ground force only had limited capabilities to affect the battlefield prior to landing. Once on the island, its armor and infantry forces would have to rely heavily on the joint services to protect their troops on the beaches and in-depth because it lacked the organic weapons to execute those fire support missions. The range and precision of the PCH191 now allows the PLAA to quickly execute these missions out to ranges nearing 500 km. Moreover, it can provide those same capabilities to assist its sister services by striking air and coastal defense missile systems, sea surface targets, and air and naval bases in Taiwan. With the continued fielding of the PCH191, the Army is moving from simply the main ground force in a Taiwan campaign to potentially the primary contributor of tactical fires on the island. … … …

Conclusion

Within a few years of the PCH191’s initial fielding to ETC and STC artillery brigades the PLAA has moved from solely contributing landing troops to becoming one of the heaviest contributors in all phases of a future Taiwan campaign. Not only will the Army dominate the amphibious landing and subsequent ground campaign, but it also controls one of the fastest and most precise fire support weapons in the entire PLA. The PLAA’s use of the PCH191 in highly publicized exercises to intimidate Taiwan following recent politically charged visits has made it clear that China intends to use the system in a potential cross-strait campaign.

The Taiwan military has clearly become concerned by China’s well-publicized training with the PCH191 during those two events. Taiwan Ministry of National Defense (MND) press releases in 2023 reference how they are monitoring ground long-range artillery forces during and after PLA exercises.74 Regular Taiwan MND X (formerly Twitter) social media feeds also include flight paths of CH-4 UAS, demonstrating their awareness of the Army platform over the Taiwan Strait.75

Ultimately, the PLAA’s wide fielding of the PCH191 since 2019 is consistent with PLA documents calling for increased fielding of precision long-range fires to fight in future large-scale ground combat operations that have massive depths, lack contact, and require multi-domain three-dimensional operations.76 The PCH191’s mobility, accuracy, and range make the new MRL an optimal weapon for nearly all future PLA large-scale ground combat operations, not just a Taiwan fight.

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Dr. Kirchberger applies knowledge and methodology from Sinological scholarship, policy expertise, and technical-industrial insights from three years as a naval analyst with shipbuilder TKMS!

Sarah Kirchberger, China’s Submarine Industrial Base: State-Led Innovation with Chinese Characteristics, China Maritime Report 31 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, September 2023).

About the Author

Dr. Sarah Kirchberger is Academic Director at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK), a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, and Vice President of the German Maritime Institute (DMI). She was previously Assistant Professor of Sinology at Hamburg University and before that, a naval analyst with shipbuilder TKMS. She is the author of Assessing China’s Naval Power: Technological Innovation, Economic Constraints, and Strategic Implications (Springer, 2015), co-author of The China Plan: A Transatlantic Blueprint for Strategic Competition (Atlantic Council, 2021) and co-editor and contributor of Russia-China Relations: Emerging Alliance or Eternal Rivals? (Springer, 2022). Her research focuses on China’s undersea warfare technologies; PLAN modernization; Chinese defense-industrial development; military-technological co-operation between China, Russia, and Ukraine; EDTs in the maritime sphere; and on the strategic importance of the South China Sea. She has testified on Chinese undersea warfare before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Kirchberger holds a Ph.D. and an M.A. in Sinology from the University of Hamburg.

The author is indebted to her colleague, Olha Husieva, for superb research assistance with Russian-language sources. Several people from the Western naval shipbuilding and military intelligence communities have kindly agreed to provide the author with some expert opinions and background assessments, but wish to remain unnamed.

Summary

In recent years, China’s naval industries have made tremendous progress supporting the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force, both through robust commitment to research and development (R&D) and the upgrading of production infrastructure at the country’s three submarine shipyards: Bohai Shipyard, Huludao; Wuchang Shipyard, Wuhan; and Jiangnan Shipyard, Shanghai. Nevertheless, China’s submarine industrial base continues to suffer from surprising weaknesses in propulsion (from marine diesels to fuel cells) and submarine quieting. Closer ties with Russia could provide opportunities for China to overcome these enduring technological limitations by exploiting political and economic levers to gain access to Russia’s remaining undersea technology secrets.

Introduction

The sprawling yet opaque ecosystem of industrial and research facilities engaged in the design and production of China’s subsurface warfare systems is not easy to quantify, let alone analyze. Long hampered by the 1989 (post-Tiananmen) arms embargo, it has profited from an avalanche of state funding; is characterized by a maze of cross-shareholdings that includes state-owned banks and listed private businesses within China and abroad; connects deeply with the academic research and development (R&D) community; and is engaged in a vast effort to overcome critical arms technology bottlenecks via ingenious methods beyond traditional espionage.1 Undersea warfare technologies are of strategic priority for the Chinese government, and R&D connected to it enjoys the highest level of political backing.2

Technical details of submarine production, including of critical subsystems, are classified in all submarine-operating countries. In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a culture of extreme secrecy in military affairs extends to even far less critical issues. Given the lack of public budgets, opaque and monopolistic procurement processes, and secret build schedules, PRC submarine procurement is shrouded in a greater degree of obscurity than that of most other countries. Sometimes, analysist discover the existence of a new submarine type only after its construction is already complete—on satellite imagery or accidentally filmed footage. This lack of transparency makes it difficult to evaluate China’s true capability at building undersea warfare systems. At the same time, China’s leaders are eager to project an image of stunning technological progress. Advances in arms production are regularly used to this end. Beijing is therefore trying to balance contradictory aims: preserving technical secrets of submarine production, while advertising breakthrough successes to signal military prowess, all the while routinely using disinformation about progress in advanced arms programs as a tool in information warfare.3

These caveats notwithstanding, there is a wealth of open sources containing hints about the arms-industrial base that is contributing to China’s submarine and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technology programs. Even job advertisements posted on Chinese university websites targeting technical degree graduates can provide valuable detail about a particular company’s or research unit’s facilities, staffing, and business areas. Further, information from foreign subsystem suppliers to China and experiences reported by China’s submarine export customers in Thailand, Pakistan, or Bangladesh can yield interesting first-hand accounts of the actual vs. the advertised capabilities of Chinese undersea warfare systems. This report relies mostly on these and other types of openly accessible source materials supplemented with a number of background conversations with Western industry executives and submarine warfare experts.4 By combining this information with the already existing knowledge on the functioning of the Chinese arms-industrial base, and extrapolating from submarine-building experiences in other countries, this report seeks to construct at least a partial picture of the current trends, successes, and remaining technical bottlenecks characterizing China’s submarine industrial base. It also offers some cautious assessments of the operational implications for China’s future fleet development. … … …

Conclusion

Due to a combination of political will, strategic funding, and ruthless exploitation of all available means to overcome technical bottlenecks, China’s naval industries have made stunning progress in the build-up of the PLAN’s submarine force and also in the upgrading of related production facilities and R&D infrastructure. The picture of technical progress is however uneven, with somewhat surprising weaknesses remaining in certain technology areas that China could be assumed to have long mastered—mostly related to propulsion (from marine diesel engines to fuel cells) and to some quieting technologies. The performance of China’s next-generation SSNs, SSBNs, and conventional AIP submarines will show how much China’s naval industries continue to be impaired by lack of access to Western technology. Further export projects of conventional submarines such as the one in Thailand may yield more data to analyze in the future.

At the same time, China is likely already a leader in some areas of great future potential, such as AI applications in the ship design process, data exploitation for situational awareness, and potentially also in AI support for submarine commanders in their tactical decision-making.

Compared with Russia, China seems to be ahead in some areas of submarine-building—such as conventional AIP propulsion, and especially in those EDTs that require a lot of funding—but seems also still to lag behind Russia in others, in particular in quieting and nuclear propulsion. This leads to a situation of potential synergies between these two submarine-producing countries. Driven by a lack of funding, Russia’s design bureaus and industries could soon face a brain drain towards China, but the Russian state might decide to halt this trend by entering into mutually profitable synergies, e.g. related to joint production, where Russia would supply essential knowhow on submarine acoustic signature quieting, nuclear propulsion design, and hydrodynamic hull design, while China’s giant and recently modernized shipyards might supply the industrial capacity to build a lot of hulls very fast, fully exploiting economy of scale effects. A Chinese news article reported that on July 5, 2023, the Commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov, visited a naval shipyard in Shanghai. The article speculated that this might indicate Russian interest in ordering hulls from China’s yards to replenish its strained naval forces, thereby overcoming Russian shipyards’ lack of production capacity and leveraging economy of scale effects, which would be possible if an existing Chinese ship design is chosen.105

Reports of a planned joint conventional submarine design project that surfaced in mid-2020 have so far not yielded any further public information, but that does not mean it has necessarily been shelved.106 In any case, sensitive ASW and undersea warfare-related technologies including hydroacoustic sensors, underwater communication, and underwater robotics are already being jointly researched by Russian and Chinese institutes, including in the context of the “Association of Sino-Russian Technical Universities” (中俄工科大学联盟, abbreviated ASRTU) that was formed in March 2011 and is headquartered in China’s submarine hub Qingdao. At the very least, this research collaboration points to a diminishing Russian resistance to cooperation with Chinese entities both in ASW and in undersea warfare-related systems development.107

One further area of Russian-Chinese cooperation with potential repercussions for submarine-building concerns nuclear fuel deliveries. On December 12, 2022, the Russian state-owned Rosatom Corp. supplied 6,477kg of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to China’s fast-breeder reactor CFR-600 on Changbiao Island. The weapons-grade plutonium it will soon produce could be used for warheads, but alternatively, commentators from the submarine research community have discussed the possibility that it could also be intended as fuel for future nuclear-powered submarines.108

Time will tell how far the Russian-Chinese “friendship without limits” can go in the highly sensitive area of submarine production, but it is safe to assume China would be highly interested in catching up with Russia’s remaining technological advantages, and willing to use its political and economic levers to obtain Russia’s submarine technology secrets.109

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Christopher P. Carlson and Howard Wang, A Brief Technical History of PLAN Nuclear Submarines, China Maritime Report 30 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, August 2023).

About the Authors

Christopher Carlson is a retired Navy Reserve Captain and Department of Defense naval systems engineer. He began his navy career as a submariner but transitioned to the naval technical intelligence field in both the Navy reserves and in his civilian job with the Defense Intelligence Agency. He has co-authored several published works with Larry Bond, to include a short story and eight full-length military thriller novels. Being an avid wargamer from an early age, Carlson is one of the co-designers, along with Larry Bond, of the Admiralty Trilogy tactical naval wargames: Harpoon V, Command at Sea, Fear God & Dread Nought, and Dawn of the Battleship. He has also authored numerous articles in the Admiralty Trilogy’s bi-annual journal, The Naval SITREP, on naval technology and combat modeling.

Howard Wang is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Wang’s primary research interests include China’s elite politics, emerging capabilities in the People’s Liberation Army, and maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region. Before joining RAND, Wang served as a policy analyst for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, where he researched U.S.-China military competition and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. He has also spent time at Guidehouse, the Jamestown Foundation, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Wang completed his Doctorate in International Affairs (DIA) at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, where he was awarded distinction for his thesis research on the Chinese Communist Party’s sea power strategy. He completed his Master’s in Public Policy at the Georgetown University McCourt School of Public Policy and his bachelor’s degree at Boston University.

Summary

After nearly 50 years since the first Type 091 SSN was commissioned, China is finally on the verge of producing world-class nuclear-powered submarines. This report argues that the propulsion, quieting, sensors, and weapons capabilities of the Type 095 SSGN could approach Russia’s Improved Akula I class SSN. The Type 095 will likely be equipped with a pump jet propulsor, a freefloating horizontal raft, a hybrid propulsion system, and 12-18 vertical launch system tubes able to accommodate anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles. China’s newest SSBN, the Type 096, will likewise see significant improvements over its predecessor, with the potential to compare favorably to Russia’s Dolgorukiy class SSBN in the areas of propulsion, sensors, and weapons, but more like the Improved Akula I in terms of quieting. If this analysis is correct, the introduction of the Type 095 and Type 096 would have profound implications for U.S. undersea security.

Introduction

It has been some 55 years since the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began building its first nuclear-powered submarine, and the journey has been anything but smooth sailing. China began its nuclear submarine program in July 1958 when Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission (CMC) authorized the “09 Project.” Mao seemed to appreciate the enormity of the challenge, as China possessed neither the intellectual or industrial capability necessary, and he was persistent in asking the Soviet Union for assistance. Finally, in October 1959, after being rebuffed numerous times, Mao issued the decree that China would proceed on a path of self-reliance in the development of nuclear submarines.1

For the next five years, progress was slow, caused by the severe lack of nuclear expertise and the political and economic chaos from Mao’s Great Leap Forward. The submarine program was also competing for the same talent and funding needed for the development of atomic weaponry, and it soon became apparent that the two projects could not be pursued simultaneously. Thus, in March 1963 the submarine program was postponed and only a small cadre of engineers continued doing technical exploration on nuclear propulsion.2 In other words, it was a research project tasked with gathering every scrap of information on how other countries used nuclear propulsion in ships and submarines. After China successfully detonated its first atomic bomb on 16 October 1964, the CMC revisited the nuclear submarine program and authorized its restart in March 1965.3 The research project ended, and the submarine design process began in earnest. … … …

Conclusion

The PLAN has had a rough road to travel in achieving its goal of producing nuclear-powered submarines. After being denied technical support by the Soviet Union numerous times, China proceeded on the path of self-reliance to design and build nuclear submarines with indigenous capabilities only. The result was that China built functional, but not very effective submarines.

In an ironic historical twist, China was able to obtain submarines, technologies, and design assistance from cash-strapped Russia starting in the mid-1990s. Through the process of “imitative innovation” Chinese engineers learned how to duplicate and then improve the technologies they had purchased. But this process took time, and the existing Type 093 and 094 submarine hulls were just too small to take full advantage of the technology that had been developed. After nearly 50 years since the first Type 091 SSN was commissioned, China is finally on the verge of producing world-class nuclear-powered submarines.

If the analyses presented above prove to be accurate, then the Type 095 has the potential to approach the propulsion, quieting, sensors, and weapons capabilities of Russia’s Improved Akula I class SSN. The Type 096 will also see significant improvements over its predecessors and could compare favorably to Russia’s Dolgorukiy class SSBN in the areas of propulsion, sensors, and weapons, but more like the Improved Akula I in terms of quieting. Should China successfully make the jump in capabilities from the current Victor III-like platform (Type 093A Version 3) to an Improved Akula I-like platform, the implications for the U.S. and its Indo-Pacific allies would be profound.

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Brian Waidelich and George Pollitt, PLAN Mine Countermeasures, Platforms, Training, and Civil-Military Integration, China Maritime Report 29 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, July 2023).

Unique insights on the latest PRC military maritime capabilities and trends from two brilliant, cutting-edge researchers, based on one of the very best papers delivered at CMSI’s April 2023 “Chinese Undersea Warfare” conference!

About the Authors

Brian Waidelich is a Research Scientist at CNA’s Indo-Pacific Security Affairs program. His research focuses on PLA organization and Indo-Pacific maritime and space security issues. Brian received a Master of Arts in Asian studies from Georgetown University and Bachelors of Arts in Chinese and English from George Mason University. He has also studied at the Nanjing University of Science and Technology.

A former Air Force navigator, George Pollitt began work in mine countermeasures (MCM) in 1971 as Technical Agent for the Mine Neutralization Vehicle System at the Naval Ship Engineering Center. He programmed MCM tactical decision aids for OPERATION END SWEEP, the clearing of mines in Haiphong, and developed MCM tactics in Panama City, FL before transferring to the Commander Mine Warfare (COMINEWARCOM) Staff, where he worked as an MCM analyst, Advisor for Research and Analysis, and Technical Director. He participated in OPERATION EARNEST WILL, the Tanker War, testing systems in the Persian Gulf to enable warships to detect mines, and he analyzed the DESERT STORM Clean-Up Operation on scene for Commander Middle Eastern Forces. At the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, he led studies on MCM platforms and systems and the Maritime 9-11 Study. Most recently he evaluated the MK 18 Mine hunting UUV system as the Independent Test and Evaluation Agent. George has an ME in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Florida and a BS in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Central Florida.

Summary

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has made incremental progress in its mine countermeasures (MCM) program in recent years. The PLAN’s current inventory of about 60 MCM ships and craft includes classes of minehunters and minesweepers mostly commissioned in the past decade as well as unmanned surface vessels (USVs) and remotely operated vehicles with demonstrated explosive neutralization capability. Despite the addition of these advanced MCM platforms and equipment, experts affiliated with the PLAN and China’s mine warfare development laboratory have serious reservations about the PLAN’s current ability to respond to the full range of likely threats posed by naval mines in future contingencies. The PLAN’s MCM forces are currently organized for operations near China’s coastline, but writings by Chinese military and civilian experts contend that to safeguard Beijing’s expanding overseas interests, the PLAN must develop MCM capabilities for operations far beyond the First Island Chain. PLAN and civilian mine warfare experts have proposed various solutions for offsetting perceived shortcomings in the PLAN’s MCM program, including the development of autonomous USVs and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), deployment of modularized MCM mission packages on ships such as destroyers and frigates, and mobilization of civilian assets such as ships and helicopters in support of MCM operations. Although there appears to have been little to no adoption of these proposed solutions to date, the PLAN recognizes MCM as one of its biggest challenges, and one can expect the PLAN to continue making measured progress in its MCM program in the years ahead.

Introduction

This report provides an overview of Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) mine countermeasures (MCM) capabilities, with a focus on related naval platforms and equipment, civil-military integration, and training activities. This report updates previous Western research on PLAN MCM, with an eye toward developments since 2010.1

The detection and neutralization of adversary naval mines is an important capability for all maritime powers, and China is no exception. Minefields deprive enemy ships of freedom of maneuver and eliminate their mobility. The laying of mines, or even the suspicion that mines have been laid in a strategic waterway such as a harbor or strait, can be enough to deter a country lacking in MCM capability from transiting that waterway. It is more difficult to clear mines than to lay mines, and mines are significantly cheaper per unit than the enemy combatants they threaten to cripple or destroy. To retain freedom of maneuver, it is imperative for maritime powers to develop MCM capability to ensure the safe passage of their commercial shipping and naval forces, especially during crisis and conflict.

In this report, we argue that the PLAN recognizes the importance of modernizing and expanding its MCM capability to operate in both “near seas” and “far seas” environments, but that evidence to date shows they have made limited progress toward this goal, possibly due to competition for resources with other naval warfare communities. We find that most or all of the PLAN’s current inventory of about 60 dedicated mine warfare ships and craft, as well as MCM equipment including remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), is likely intended for operations within the First Island Chain. We also note People’s Republic of China (PRC) interest in using civilian platforms to augment its MCM capability, although there is little evidence of recent training or investments in this area. We found that the PLAN currently maintains an inventory of remotely-controlled mine sweeping USVs but appears to lack minehunting UUVs, despite the fact that PRC shipbuilders are clearly capable of building related platforms.

The data analyzed for this report was drawn primarily from Chinese-language technical journal and newspaper articles published between 2010 and 2022. Priority was given to articles authored by individuals with credible ties to China’s MCM program, namely authors with institutional affiliations to the PLAN and to the state-owned China State Shipbuilding Corporation’s (CSSC) No. 710 Research Institute, China’s mine warfare development laboratory.2 As with any analysis of PLA capabilities based on publicly available writings, this report presents a partial and likely incomplete picture of the initiatives underway in China’s MCM development, some of which may be classified or otherwise deemed too sensitive for public disclosure.

The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Section one examines PRC military and civilian authors’ views of the naval mine threat environment and motivations for expanding the PLAN’s MCM capability outside the First Island Chain. The second section lays out what is currently known from publicly available sources on the PLAN’s current MCM capability (platforms, equipment, etc.) as well as capabilities it may be developing based on evidence from PRC writings. In the third section, we discuss PRC views on incorporating civilian platforms such as ships, helicopters, and UUVs into MCM operations and the types of tasks those civilian platforms could potentially undertake. The fourth section offers a brief overview of MCM training exercises carried out within the PLAN and with foreign militaries. The final section summarizes observed progress in the PLAN’s MCM capability since 2010 and compares the differing approaches to MCM in the PLAN and U.S. Navy. … … …

Conclusion

The PLAN’s General View of MCM

PRC military and civilian authors offer rather bleak assessments of the PLAN’s existing capability to neutralize enemy mine threats, particularly as the PLAN operates at greater distances from mainland China. As Hu Ce, an author from the No. 710 Research Institute put it, a naval blockade could stress the PLAN’s existing MCM capability to the point that “the survivability and operations of the Chinese Navy’s forces would be seriously challenged” and that “the national economy and even the strategic overall situation could be affected” (emphasis added).67 A senior engineer from the PLAN’s Yichang Area Military Representative Office, emphasized the near seas-centric role of existing PLAN MCM forces, stressing that they are “seriously inadequate [for] supporting mid- and far seas protection operations.”68

Despite PRC authors’ self-acknowledged shortcomings, a comparison with past Western analyses of PLAN MCM capability demonstrates that the PLAN has in some respects made progress in fielding more advanced MCM platforms and equipment. PRC military and civilian subject matter experts have also advocated for advancements in a variety of unmanned MCM capabilities and the integration of civilian assets, although little or no evidence of progress in these areas has been observed in publicly available sources. We summarize related developments since 2010 in Table 2 below.

Autonomous Platforms

There is much advocacy in PRC writings for the integration of military or civilian autonomous platforms, including USVs and UUVs, for MCM operations. Apart from the PLAN’s existing Wonang-class remotely-controlled craft, however, we saw no evidence of the PLAN fielding such platforms for MCM purposes or bringing analogous civilian platforms in for demonstrations or training exercises.

Conventional Minehunting

The press has noted that Chinese MCM ships are not modern ships made from fiberglass, as are Western MCM ships, and that emphasis has been placed on mine sweeping over mine hunting. With China’s technical skill in automation and with the emphasis in PRC writings on increasing the use of unmanned platforms throughout the force, it seems plausible that in the future the PLAN may skip further development of conventional minehunting and go directly to highly automated unmanned minehunting.

Range of Operations

What is publicly known about the capabilities and ranges of PLAN MCM ships and craft, coupled with accounts of their shortcomings by PRC authors, suggests that current MCM craft must operate relatively close to mainland bases. They may lack the ability to achieve full coverage of waters within the First Island Chain.

Organic MCM

One PRC author claims it is especially important for the PLAN to have “organic MCM” capabilities for “far-seas missions,” i.e., for PLAN missions outside the First Island Chain in which dedicated MCM platforms are less likely to be available. As they pointed out, during far-seas operations, specialized MCM forces are usually unavailable, so forces must “save themselves” by relying on their own capabilities to counter naval mines.69 However, it has not been explicitly stated in the literature that the PLAN has been developing systems for organic MCM for ships in the far seas. PRC media reviewed for this report did show examples of PLAN destroyers or frigates conducting MCM training, but this was limited to relatively simple fires against floating mines.

Use of Civilian Assets

PRC writings portray MCM support missions as a natural avenue of civil-military cooperation that builds upon decades of past practice. However, the writings did not reference recent examples of the actual use or training in the use of non-PLAN platforms. A logical civil-military cooperation for MCM would be to use fishing craft to perform MCM functions, as the British did in World War I. Civilian ships are available that could tend multiple unmanned systems as mother ships, but PRC civilian and military authors have not stated any intention of using mother ships, military or otherwise, for mine countermeasures. PLA-affiliated authors have noted that few civilian ships to date have been built to national defense standards. There are advocates within the Chinese MCM community for using civilian helicopters; but again, PRC writings have not mentioned any intention to use them.

Training

The spotty and often vague nature of PRC media reporting on PLAN training makes it difficult to generalize about PLAN MCM forces’ levels of capability and readiness. What is clear from PRC subject matter experts’ writings is that they find the state of training to be less than ideal and believe that improvements need to be made. One such area for improvement is simulation training, in which organizations throughout the PLA have been making investments in recent years.70 As one PLAN engineer argued, better MCM simulation training is necessary given the increasingly high costs and risks of conducting training with modern MCM assets and high-tech naval mines.71 Despite the advocacy, it is unclear whether PLAN leaders have the budget or inclination to build such training systems for MCM forces. Although the PLA as a whole continues to enjoy annual budget increases—7.2 percent in 2023—decision-makers are also likely facing hard budgetary choices as they commission more advanced capabilities, like aircraft carriers, and seek to use monetary incentives to improve retention and professionalism of the force.

Comparison with the U.S. Navy

Some parallels exist between the PLAN and the U.S. Navy in their attitudes toward mine warfare. In both cases, MCM is at the bottom of the priority list for assignments and careers. As a PLAN ditty begins, “if you get on a ship, don’t get on a minesweeping ship.”72 In both services, there are advocates for needed MCM capabilities, but little action is taken beyond the building of hulls.69

The main contrast between the U.S. Navy and PLAN is in the placement of their MCM assets: the U.S. Navy stations its MCM assets forward to protect the fleet, whereas the PLAN stations its assets at home to protect waters within the First Island Chain. This could change in the future as the PLA develops its existing base in Djibouti and expands its military footprint in other countries. Another difference between the two militaries is that the PLAN recognizes MCM as one of its major challenges—with some authors calling it the greatest challenge—whereas the U.S. Navy seems relatively unconcerned, especially in terms of protecting CONUS ports.

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Michael Dahm and Alison Zhao, Bitterness Ends, Sweetness Begins: Organizational Changes to the PLAN Submarine Force Since 2015, China Maritime Report 28 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, June 2023).

About the Authors

Michael Dahm is a principal intelligence analyst at the MITRE Corporation where he focuses on Indo-Pacific security issues and challenges presented by the People’s Republic of China across the spectrum of competition. Before joining MITRE, he was a senior researcher at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory where he focused on foreign technology development. He has over 25 years of experience as a U.S. Navy intelligence officer with extensive experience in the Asia-Pacific region, including a tour as an Assistant U.S. Naval Attaché in Beijing, China, and Senior Naval Intelligence Officer for China at the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Alison Zhao is an Indo-Pacific advisor in the Commonwealth and Partner Engagement Directorate, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security. Her prior career assignments include positions in the Defense Attaché Office, U.S. Embassy Beijing; the Joint Staff; and U.S. Forces Korea. She holds a M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College and a B.A. in International Relations and East Asian Studies from Johns Hopkins University.

The authors would like to thank the China Maritime Studies Institute’s Dr. Andrew Erickson for his encouragement to pursue this project and Ryan Martinson for his editorial review, research assistance, and constructive recommendations. The authors alone are responsible for any errors or omissions contained in this report.

Summary

“Above-the-neck” reforms in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that began in 2015 directed the development of a new joint operational command system that resulted in commensurate changes to PLA Navy submarine force command and control. Additional changes to tactical submarine command and control were driven by the evolution and expansion of PLA Navy surface and airborne capabilities and the introduction of new longer-range submarine weapons. Follow-on “below-theneck” reforms inspired significant organizational change across most of China’s military services. However, the PLA Navy submarine force, for its part, did not reorganize its command structure but instead focused on significant improvements to the composition and quality of its force. Between 2017 and 2023, the PLA Navy submarine force engaged in a notable transformation, shuffling personnel and crews among twenty-six submarines—eleven newly commissioned and fifteen since retired—relocating in-service submarines to ensure an equitable distribution of newer, more capable submarines across the fleet. Observations of infrastructure improvements at PLA Navy submarine bases portend even more changes to submarine force structure in the coming years.

Introduction

Since the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reforms began in 2015, the PLA Navy (PLAN) submarine force has likely endured one of the most tumultuous transformations in its history. “Bitterness ends, sweetness begins” (苦尽甘来) is a Chinese idiom that means the worst is over and better times lie ahead. While the reforms were probably difficult to swallow for the submarine force, they have almost certainly had a positive impact on PLAN undersea warfare capabilities.

The initial phase of PLA reforms—called the “above-the-neck” reforms for its focus on changes to top-level organizations—resulted in the creation of a joint operational command system. In the new system, geographic operational theaters took over control of ships and submarines from PLAN headquarters. The introduction of new technologies in the PLAN, including longer-range reconnaissance and surveillance and longer-range conventional and strategic weapons in the submarine force, drove further changes to submarine command and control.

While the first phase of reforms focused on the “head,” the subsequent phase of “below-the-neck” reforms, which began in 2017, resulted in changes to operational units, i.e., the “body” of the PLA. The PLA Army (PLAA) and Air Force (PLAAF) experienced profound organizational change—commands were combined or eliminated, and formations were fundamentally restructured. By contrast, the PLAN saw relatively few changes to its organizational structure, remaining very similar to its pre-reform state. But even if its command relationships were not reorganized in the reforms, changes to force structure and composition had significant impacts on the PLAN submarine force.

Key findings of this report include:

• “Above-the-neck” and “below-the-neck reforms resulted in significant changes to the operational command and control of PLAN forces. Fleet organizational structure remained in place serve the PLAN’s “man, train, and equip” functions.
• The “maritime operations sub-center” (MOSC) is the newly created PLAN-run maritime component of the theater joint operations command system in each PLA operational theater command. MOSCs now exercise command and control over most PLAN submarine deployments.
• Changes to tactical-level submarine command and control have been driven by new PLAN ships and aircraft in the fleet as well as new, longer-range weapons in the submarine force.
• The Central Military Commission’s (CMC) Joint Operations Command Center probably exercises exclusive control over ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs).
• Overseas submarine operations probably fall under the control of the CMC Joint Staff Department; however, operational theater commands have also demonstrated command and control of PLAN forces thousands of miles from China’s shores.
• “Below-the-neck” reforms in the PLAN submarine force did not result in changes to command organizational structure but did involve significant shifts in submarine fleet composition, and the attendant inter-fleet transfers of submarines and crews.
• Force structure changes were driven by the arrival of a dozen newly constructed submarines and the retirement of older nuclear and conventional submarines.
• Observed infrastructure improvements at PLAN nuclear submarine bases indicate that the PLAN will likely continue to incorporate new submarines over the next several years, probably extending the recent cycle of submarine and crew transfers.

This report comprises two sections and an appendix. Section one examines the first phase of PLA reform—the “above-the-neck” reforms—that began in 2015. This section discusses changes to joint operational command and control and its impact on PLAN submarine operations. It also goes into detail on PLAN task group organization, tactical command and control of submarines, and issues surrounding the control of strategic assets (e.g., SSBNs) and the command of foreign exercises and “far seas” operations. Section two examines the impacts of “below-the-neck” reforms and changes in submarine force structure. It also discusses the recently detected construction of submarine base infrastructure that likely portends further expansion of the PLAN submarine force. The report concludes with an appendix that offers details about PLAN submarine operational bases.

Conclusion

The PLAN submarine force has arguably undergone historical change since the 2015 “above-the-neck” reforms and 2017 “below-the-neck” reforms. Changes to command and control arrangements emphasizing joint coordination of undersea forces, the introduction of a dozen new submarines, and the retirement of even more has almost certainly resulted in impactful changes in the fleet. As the changes have settled out, they have likely resulted in an overall increase in PLAN submarine capabilities.

As outlined in this report, changes to operational command and control of undersea and other maritime forces have become clearer since the PLA’s joint operational command system was created as part of the “above-the-neck” and “below-the-neck” reforms. The theater “maritime operations subcenter,” similar to a U.S. Navy joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) or maritime operations center (MOC) has emerged as the PLAN component under the operational theaters’ joint operations command center (T-JOCC). This command and control construct holds great promise for PLA joint operations but remains untested in a real-world contingency or conflict.

Control of PLA non-war military activities and operations abroad have apparently been consolidated under the CMC Joint Staff Department. However, the PLA’s operational theaters appear to be firmly in charge of wartime command and control and have directed operational forces thousands of miles from their respective theaters in what appears to be contingency planning exercises. How the PLA will grapple with operational control of combat forces including submarines in areas not directly related to a contingency on China’s periphery remains unclear.

New technologies have been the principal driver of change in the PLAN submarine force over the past several years, a trend that will likely continue well into the future. Other PLA services may have reshaped their formations and command organizations to address deficiencies in how they manage operations and how they fight wars. In contrast, technology appears to drive how the PLAN submarine force fights, which then necessitates commensurate changes in command and control.

Granted, there may be a “chicken-egg” argument to be made as to whether technology begat changes in command and control or whether command and control requirements drove changes in technology. Regardless, the introduction of PLAN airborne surveillance and control aircraft like the KQ-200 and KJ-500, more capable ships for at-sea command and control like Renhai cruisers and aircraft carriers, new communications technologies, and uncrewed surface and underwater systems will likely continue to transform how the PLAN operates its submarines. Similarly, new longer-range weapons including submarine-launched anti-ship and land-attack missiles will drive future command and control arrangements for the PLAN submarine force.

Military services like the PLAA and PLAAF resized and reorganized in the name of reforms, making them more joint and, at least on paper, leaner and more combat effective. Although major PLAN submarine force command and unit reorganization did not occur, the PLAN sought to optimize its force structure and composition, retooling its force to enhance joint interoperability and combat effectiveness by shedding legacy platforms and gaining more capable, new-construction submarines. The addition of a dozen new submarines and the retirement of fifteen older generation submarines in the PLAN submarine force served the “below-the-neck” reform goal of increasing operational capability and capacity. The changes appear to meet Xi Jinping’s imperative for the PLAN to prepare to “fight and win wars.” Future interfleet transfers of submarines and crews will likely continue to be necessary given the projections for new nuclear and conventional submarines entering the force through 2030.

It is entirely possible, if not likely, that the changes observed in the PLAN submarine force over the past six years would have happened regardless of a PLA-wide campaign of reform and change. Submarine construction programs and lifecycles are measured in decades. The new submarines commissioned between 2017 and 2023 had been programmed to enter the fleet long before anyone had heard of “above-the-neck” or “below-the-neck” reforms. Similarly, many older PLAN submarines were beyond their prime and needed to be retired from the force regardless of a reform campaign.

In the final analysis, “below-the-neck” reform submarine transfers were fairly modest—two Song SS transferred from the Northern to Southern Theater, a couple of Yuan SSP transferred from the Eastern to Northern Theater, and as many as nine older Ming SS decommissioned from the Northern and Southern Theaters between 2017 and 2018. The timing of the “above-the-neck” and “below-the-neck” reforms conveniently allowed the PLAN to demonstrate to PLA leadership that the submarine force was ostensibly making sacrifices as part of the larger, collective reform effort across the PLA. However, the inter-fleet transfers to accommodate the commissioning and retirement of submarines continued beyond 2018 and will likely continue for the next several years.

Changes to PLAN submarine base infrastructure are likely leading indicators of future changes in submarine force structure. Infrastructure improvements at PLAN nuclear submarine bases outlined in this report indicate that the PLAN will continue to receive and incorporate new submarines over the next several years. The cycle of submarine and crew transfers observed in this report will likely continue through 2030 as new nuclear and AIP submarines enter the force and older Ming, Song, and Kilo submarines are retired. … … …

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Roderick Lee, PLA Navy Submarine Leadership—Factors Affecting Operational Performance, China Maritime Report 27 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, June 2023).

About the Author

Roderick Lee is the Director of Research at the Air University’s China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI). Prior to joining CASI, he served as an analyst with the United States Navy covering Chinese naval forces. He earned his Master of Arts degree from The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, or Department of Defense.

Summary

The way the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) selects and manages its submarine officers increases the likelihood of human performance errors onboard a PLAN submarine. First, PLAN submarine officers are selected from applicants with among the lowest college entrance examinations of any PLA educational institution, suggesting that PLAN submariners are among the service’s least talented officers. Second, the Party Committee system at the apex of decision-making aboard PLAN submarines may be less agile than other approaches to command, at least in certain circumstances. Lastly, while the policy of embarking flotilla leaders senior to the submarine captain may reduce some of the negative effects associated with the first two conditions, it could lead to reduced performance when senior leaders are not present. If external events during wartime stressed these factors, the likelihood of human-induced error events in the PLAN submarine force could increase substantially.

Introduction

In the undersea domain, the United States should be seeking to exploit several human factors against the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in peacetime, contingencies, and wartime. Individual PLAN leaders with a submarine background may have influence on force development and operational planning in peacetime. By understanding who has influence on PLA undersea capabilities and what biases those individuals might have, the United States can shape said peacetime planning decisions in its favor. In contingencies and in wartime, the United States can try to use those same biases to predict or even influence force employment. The unfortunate reality is that data on PLA senior leadership has grown increasingly scarce, making it difficult to establish a framework for projecting potential influencing factors on senior leadership. The PLA has begun limiting the amount of public exposure that its senior officers receive, and there is even some evidence to suggest the PLA is actively censoring the identity of its flag and general officers. The somewhat opaque decision-making processes of the PLA further complicates the process of determining who within the PLA has influence and how the United States can exploit that influence. Instead of embarking on a glorified tealeaf reading mission, time is better spent on trying to understand a system that is more rigid and not subject to the whims of individuals. To that end, this report examines who makes up China’s submarine officer corps, how they are educated, and how these individuals interact with each other onboard a submarine. Ultimately, this report seeks to understand what exploitable human factors might exist within the PLAN submarine officer corps. … … …

Conclusion

There are no clear and glaring flaws in how the PLAN leads its submarine force. Although its educational system underwent some turmoil in the beginning of the 21st century and continues to encounter challenges today, these challenges do not appear to be substantial enough to dramatically affect operational performance. Likewise, although the interactions of leaders onboard a submarine have the potential to create uncertainty or erode confidence, the structure itself does not present inherent flaws. That said, the PLAN’s leadership approach does possess a few characteristics that may be exploitable both in peacetime and wartime. Doing so could help degrade the PLAN’s ability to employ submarines in an optimal manner. These efforts should mainly focus on increasing the likelihood of human error occurring onboard a PLAN submarine.

The Department of Energy’s Human Performance Improvement Handbook serves as a useful framework to understand how one can mitigate the likelihood and effects of errors associated with human performance. It also offers insights into how one might increase the likelihood of said errors. This document specifies that an error-likely event is “a work situation in which there is greater chance for error when performing a specific action or task in the presence of error precursors.”80 Defined as “conditions that provoke error,” error precursors can be categorized into tasks demands, individual capabilities, work environment, and human nature.81 See Table 1 below.

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Lonnie D. Henley, Beyond the First Battle: Overcoming a Protracted Blockade of Taiwan, China Maritime Report 26 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, March 2023).

About the Author

Lonnie Henley is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He retired from federal service in 2019 after more than 40 years as an intelligence officer and East Asia expert. Henley served 22 years as a U.S. Army China foreign area officer and military intelligence officer in U.S. Forces Korea, at Defense Intelligence Agency, on Army Staff, and in the History Department at West Point. He retired as a Lieutenant Colonel in 2000 and joined the senior civil service, first as Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia and later as Senior Intelligence Expert for Strategic Warning at DIA. He worked two years as a senior analyst with CENTRA Technology, Inc. before returning to government service as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia. He rejoined DIA in 2008, serving six years as the agency’s senior China analyst, then National Intelligence Collection Officer for East Asia, and culminating with a second term as DIO for East Asia. Mr. Henley holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering and Chinese from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and master’s degrees in Chinese language from Oxford University, which he attended as a Rhodes Scholar; in Chinese history from Columbia University; and in strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College (now National Intelligence University). His wife Sara Hanks is a corporate attorney and CEO specializing in early-stage capital formation. They live in Alexandria, Virginia.

This article was cleared for open publication by the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Prepublication and Security Review, DOPSR Case 21-S-1603. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Navy, Department of Defense (DoD), or any other U.S. government entity. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the DoD of the linked websites or the information, products, or services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.

Summary

If there is a war over Taiwan, an extended Chinese blockade is likely to determine the outcome. While a blockade might include intercepting ships at sea, the primary focus would be on sealing airfields and ports, particularly on the west coast of Taiwan. China could sustain that type of blockade indefinitely. Penetrating a prolonged blockade and keeping Taiwan alive would require a serious U.S. investment in systems and operational concepts that we currently do not have. Unless we make that investment, we may win the first battle, defeating an attempted landing. But we cannot win the war.

Introduction

Maneuvers by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in August 2022 marked the first time the PLA has openly signaled that a blockade of Taiwan is among the military courses of action for which it plans and trains. Chinese forces established closure areas near Taiwan’s major ports for what the Chinese media called “joint blockade and joint support operations” (联合封控和联合保障行动).1 Training events included establishing air superiority and conducting maritime and land strikes and anti-submarine warfare, with explicit reference to Taiwan targets and Taiwan forces, and the need to interdict U.S. forces deploying into the area.2 Chinese commentators emphasized that both the proximity to Taiwan ports and the encirclement of Taiwan were unprecedented for PLA exercises3.

There is danger that the exercises we observed will foster a false belief that breaking a Chinese blockade would be a straightforward task easily within the capability of current and projected U.S. forces. It would not be. In a serious military conflict over Taiwan, the kind of blockade China would impose would be vastly more difficult to counter. In this author’s assessment, nothing the United States armed forces are doing or planning to do is sufficient to prevail in that conflict. … … …

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Impactful encore publication by J. Michael Dahm, a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer. Among his Indo-Pacific assignments, he formerly served as Assistant U.S. Naval Attaché in Beijing—and graciously hosted me and my CMSI colleagues there. Check out the revealing accompanying graphics: 26 tables, 37 figures!

J. Michael Dahm, More Chinese Ferry Tales: China’s Use of Civilian Shipping in Military Activities, 2021–2022, China Maritime Report 25 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, January 2023).

About the Author

J. Michael Dahm is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 25 years of service. He has focused on Asia-Pacific security matters since 2006 when he served as Chief of Intelligence Plans for China and later established the Commander’s China Strategic Focus Group at the U.S. Pacific Command. From 2012–2015, he was an Assistant Naval Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, China. Before retiring from the Navy in 2017, he served as the Senior Naval Intelligence Officer for China at the Office of Naval Intelligence. The author would like to thank the China Maritime Studies Institute’s Dr. Andrew Erickson for his encouragement to pursue this project and Ryan Martinson for his detailed editorial review and constructive recommendations. This report reflects the analysis and opinions of the author alone. The author is responsible for any errors or omissions contained in this report.

Sources and Methods

This report fuses a variety of publicly and commercially available sources to gain detailed insights into often complex military activity and capabilities. Analysis is supported with AIS data from MarineTraffic—Global Ship Tracking Intelligence.104 Google Earth images are attributed to the commercial satellite provider and published under the Google Earth terms of service.105 The report features commercial satellite imagery from Planet Labs PBC. Medium-resolution satellite imagery from Planet’s PlanetScope constellation (ground sample distance (GSD) ~3.7 meters) and high-resolution satellite imagery from Planet’s SkySat constellation (GSD ~0.5 meters) were purchased by the author through SkyWatch Space Applications Inc. The report also features commercial satellite imagery from Airbus Intelligence. Images from Airbus’ Pleiades constellation (GSD ~0.5 meters) and Pleiades Neo constellation (GSD ~0.3 meters) were also purchased by the author through SkyWatch Space Applications Inc.106 The SkyWatch team’s advice and assistance in accessing archived imagery and tasking satellite collection was greatly appreciated. The author is responsible for all annotations of satellite images contained in this report. Planet and Airbus retain copyrights to the underlying PlanetScope, SkySat, Pleiades, and Pleiades Neo images respectively. Other than Google Earth derived images, satellite images published in this report should not be reproduced without the expressed permission of Planet or Airbus.

Summary

This report provides a comprehensive assessment of Chinese civilian shipping support to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), examining civil maritime-military activities from October 2021 through September 2022. As of 2022, the PLA and its reserve civilian merchant fleet are still probably unable to provide significant amphibious landing capabilities or the maritime logistics in austere or challenging environments necessary to support a major cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. However, large volume lift exercises conducted in 2022 suggest that the PLA has made significant progress in the use of civilian vessels for the large-scale lift of PLA troops and equipment into undefended ports, a capability that may be leveraged in a military assault on Taiwan. This report also discusses other civil maritime-military activities not previously observed, including the use of civilian vessels and infrastructure to conceal PLA troop movements, operations from austere ports, use of ocean-going vessels to transport PLA forces along inland waterways, and logistics support for China’s South China Sea outposts.

Introduction

This report is a follow-on to China Maritime Report No. 16, which assessed PLA use of civilian shipping for logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) and amphibious landings in 2020 and 2021.1 Like its predecessor, this report analyzes commercially available ship tracking data, satellite imagery, media reporting, and other open-source material to assess the capabilities of PLA logistics troops and supporting civilian ships, especially roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) ferries. Unlike the earlier study that focused on major amphibious exercises, this report provides a comprehensive examination of all Chinese civil maritime-military events over an entire year.

Examining Chinese civil maritime-military events over time offers several advantages. It provides a greater understanding of the diversity of civil maritime-military events and how they may be prioritized. Foreign observers tend to focus on a Taiwan contingency, but the PLA is preparing to use—indeed, is already using—civilian shipping for other missions that merit attention. Even in the case of a Taiwan contingency, civilian ships may not be tasked only with LOTS. A comprehensive review of annual training sheds light on these other possible missions. Lastly, this approach offers analysis of training patterns over the course of a full year and lays the foundation for future studies of Chinese civil maritime-military training activities over multiple years.

This report examines thirty-eight civil maritime-military events that occurred between October 2021 and September 2022. A detailed analysis of these events reveals the focus of PLA training with civilian RO-RO vessels was moving ground forces from port-to-port. During the period under consideration, the PLA also used civilian vessels to train for beach landings. Those landings featured an updated version of the PLA floating causeway system for over-the-shore logistics discussed in China Maritime Report No. 16. But these landing events, which began in May and culminated in a September amphibious landing exercise, appeared to have modest aims and did not stress exercise participants with realistic combat conditions. Despite some increase in scale and complexity compared to the 2021 capstone landing exercise, the 2022 exercise strongly suggests that the PLA remains limited in its ability to employ civilian RO-RO ferries as part of a major beach assault against Taiwan. However, 2022 events overall do indicate that China’s civil maritime industry has significantly advanced core capabilities for the large-scale lift of PLA troops and equipment into undefended, captured ports, capabilities that may be leveraged in a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan.

Other findings include:

• An April 2022 event demonstrated the coordinated use of ten smaller RO-RO ferries probably to deploy a large PLA formation of vehicles. (See pages 7–8)
• In November 2021 and September 2022, large, ocean-going RO-RO ferries moved what were probably PLA units up the Yangtze River to the inland port of Nanjing. (See pages 8–10)
• An August 2022 event revealed how the PLA would likely use port infrastructure, including large warehouses, to camouflage and conceal military movements from civilian ports via civilian shipping. (See pages 10–12)
• In several events, civilian RO-RO ships operated from relatively austere ports without the use of tugboats or substantial port infrastructure to load and unload military equipment. (See pages 12–13)
  • The PLA demonstrated significant increases in the volume of civil maritime-generated lift compared to observations of activity in 2020–2021.
  • From July-August 2022, twelve RO-RO ferries and cargo ships conducted 82 transits between eleven Chinese ports in a five-week-long large volume lift exercise. The exercise may have transported more than 8,500 military vehicles and 58,000 troops, probably equivalent to a group army (six PLA Army (PLAA) combined arms brigades plus six supporting brigades). (See pages 14–27)
• The July–August 2022 event and a September event appeared to focus on moving nonamphibious, heavy combined arms units, elements that would likely constitute follow-on, second echelon forces in a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. (See pages 28–31)
• The PLA exercised an improved floating causeway system, used by RO-RO ships to deploy forces directly into a beach landing area. The new modular system extends 2,130 feet (650 meters) from the shore, 40 percent farther than the causeway observed in 2021 training. (See pages 32–34)
• An amphibious landing capstone exercise in September 2022 was marginally more complex than a similar landing exercise observed in September 2021. (See pages 36–44)
  • Compared to the eight ships involved in the 2021 exercise, ten ships participated in the 2022 landing exercise and, like the 2021 exercise, were integrated with PLA Navy (PLAN) amphibious ships in offshore landing evolutions.
  • Four RO-RO ferries conducted offshore launches of amphibious armored vehicles or assault boats, double the number of RO-RO ferries that deployed forces at sea in 2021.
• Two RO-RO ferries and two general cargo ships provided military logistics support to PLA island outposts in the South China Sea. (See pages 45–47)

This report comprises five sections and two appendices. Section one provides a brief overview of events observed during the 2021–2022 time period. Sections two through five present detailed analysis of the four main categories of events observed: inter- / intra-theater mobility, large volume lift exercises, amphibious landings and LOTS, and South China Sea logistics support. The report concludes with Appendix A, offering a listing and details of Chinese merchant ships observed participating in civil-maritime activity, and Appendix B, describing Chinese ports assessed to have supported civil-military activity. … … …

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Ryan D. Martinson, Incubators of Sea Power: Vessel Training Centers and the Modernization of the PLAN Surface Fleet, China Maritime Report 24 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, November 2022).

About the Author

Ryan D. Martinson is a researcher in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College. He holds a master’s degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a bachelor’s of science from Union College. Martinson has also studied at Fudan University, the Beijing Language and Culture University, and the Hopkins-Nanjing Center. His research primarily focusses on the intersection between marine policy and military strategy. Martinson’s work has appeared in periodicals such as the Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, the RUSI Journal, Asian Security, the Journal of Strategic Studies, the Naval War College Review, Marine Policy, Orbis, and Survival.

The author would like to thank Dan Caldwell, CDR Tim Drosinos, and Conor Kennedy for helping to improve this report. Any errors or omissions are his alone.

Summary

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is building modern surface combatants faster than any other navy in the world. Before these new ships can be deployed, however, their crews must learn how to effectively operate them across the range of missions for which they were designed. In the PLAN, this “basic training” largely occurs at specialized organizations called Vessel Training Centers (VTCs). Since their creation in 1980, VTCs have played a key role in generating combat power for the fleet. But as China’s naval ambitions have grown, the VTCs have been forced to adapt. Since the early 2000s, and especially since 2012, they have faced tremendous pressure to keep pace with the rapid expansion and modernization of the PLAN surface fleet and its growing mission set, improve the standards and quality of vessel training, and uphold the integrity of training evaluations. This report argues that the PLAN’s VTCs have generally risen to the challenge, ensuring that new and recently-repaired ships can quickly reach operational units in a fairly high state of readiness.

Introduction

China’s first Type 055 cruiser, the Nanchang, was commissioned on January 21, 2020 in Qingdao, Shandong, home to the Northern Theater Command Navy.1 Commentators naturally fixated on the physical characteristics of the new ship: her length and displacement, the numbers and dimensions of her missile cells, her dual-band radar, and her “stealthy” lines.2 By these (and other) metrics, the Nanchang was among the most advanced warships in the world.3 But a ship, no matter how advanced, can only realize its full combat potential if it is operated by a competent crew.4 Development of that competence involves months—possibly years—of intensive training under the guidance of dedicated and knowledgeable instructors.

For the Nanchang, and hundreds of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships preceding her, that training began immediately upon commissioning, at a specialized unit called a Vessel Training Center (VTC). These organizations serve the vital function of transforming new or recently-repaired ships into combat-ready assets. Instructors at VTCs help provide the “basic training” (基础训练) for ship crews that allows them to be certified for deployment on that platform. Training done at VTCs serves as the foundation for follow on training with other arms of the navy and the joint force. As such, PLAN experts often describe VTCs as “incubators” (孵化器) of surface fleet combat power.5 … … …

Conclusion

Like other modern navies, the PLAN relies on specialized organizations to provide basic training for newly-commissioned or recently-repaired surface vessels. These organizations, called VTCs, are located in each of the three Theater Command navies. Since their creation in the 1980s, they have played a vital role in transforming PLAN ships—everything from mine sweepers to amphibious assault ships, but excluding aircraft carriers—into technically- and tactically-competent fighting units prepared for integration with the rest of the operational navy.

In recent years, VTCs have faced tremendous pressure to adapt to the needs of a rapidly expanding and modernizing fleet. Beginning in the early 2000s with a wave of new fast attack craft and frigates, followed later by a surge of new corvettes, frigates, destroyers, cruisers, LPDs, LHDs, and auxiliaries, the PLAN has built dozens of surface vessels at a rate unmatched by any other contemporary navy, with the most recent classes ranking among the most modern in the world. How have the VTCs fared in their efforts to translate this latent combat power into real operational capabilities across the full range of wartime and peacetime missions for which these ships were designed?

As this report demonstrates, the VTCs have clearly succeeded in their most basic function: providing enough training to enough crews so that new ships can quickly reach the fleet with an acceptable degree of readiness. This has been extremely challenging for the VTCs, previously accustomed to training small batches of ships, with training beginning at the same time every year. To augment training capacity, they have borrowed training expertise and resources from operational units, altered internal processes to allow new ships to begin training throughout the year (instead of a single annual start date), developed mass training methods, embraced the use of simulators, expanded training staff and training facilities, and required that VTC personnel work as long and as hard as necessary to get the job done. As a result, VTCs have proven themselves capable of supporting the PLAN’s colossal shipbuilding program, enabling most new ships to complete basic training within the standard 6-12 months.

At the same time that the VTCs have expanded training capacity, they have also strived to improve the quality of the training they provide. They have done this through a system of “training supervision” comprising a staff of officers charged with monitoring training quality and providing feedback to crew members (and trainers) and soliciting feedback from sailors receiving instruction. Due to the rapid pace of modernization, VTC instructors may lack first-hand experience with the weapons, equipment, and systems installed on the newest ship classes. To bridge this knowledge gap, VTCs provide professional development opportunities for training staff and require them to keep abreast of new technologies by consulting with shipbuilders and equipment vendors. To ensure a committed and motivated training staff, the VTCs provide additional compensation tied to job performance.

Even if basic training is led by a highly dedicated and knowledgeable training staff working at well-equipped training facilities, training outcomes may still be less than optimal. Much depends on the standards of competence ship crews are expected to achieve. These standards are defined in training outlines (OMTEs) specific to each class of ship. Because the PLAN does not release these documents, it is difficult to gauge how training standards compare with those of other modern navies. This may only be possible through careful observation of deployed PLAN vessels that have recently completed basic training.

What is clear is that institutional and cultural problems have undermined the PLAN’s efforts to ensure that ship crews actually meet all the training standards outlined in the OMTEs. This is done through formal evaluations over the course of basic training and a final, multi-day comprehensive training evaluation held after basic training is complete. VTCs have strong incentives to give passing marks to all ships/crews that they train, because doing so reflects well on them. However, in recent years the PLAN—following guidance from above—has implemented a system that involves “third party” entities in the evaluation process. These teams of experts from the Theater Command Navy Staff Department are more insulated from institutional pressures to achieve high success rates. By some accounts, this new system is yielding more objective assessments. Perhaps more problematic, the PLAN continues to be plagued by a culture of corruption, cheating, and cronyism. In some cases, individual training evaluators accept bribes in exchange for positive evaluations or a preview of testing content. In other case, they may show favoritism to friends and former colleagues. Recent reports indicate that these problems with PLAN organizational culture continue to harm the integrity of training evaluations, despite efforts to mitigate them.

The data presented in this report does not allow for a detailed comparison between PLAN basic training and U.S. Navy Basic Phase training. Still, some insights are possible. First, training timelines are very similar. PLAN basic training generally lasts 6-12 months, sometimes longer and sometimes shorter, largely depending the class of ship and the initial training levels of the crew. U.S. Navy Basic Phase training is intended to last precisely 24 weeks (5.5 months).

Second, despite similar timelines, PLAN basic training appears to cover more content than U.S. Navy Basic Phase training. After completing basic training and passing all evaluations, PLAN vessels are expected to be ready for almost immediate deployment, as single ships or as members of “ship formations” (i.e., surface action groups). Therefore, basic training includes subjects such as joint ASW, joint air defense, and joint search and rescue, which the U.S. Navy leaves for later phases in the training process. Moreover, PLAN basic training concludes with a multi-day comprehensive training evaluation that certifies that a ship and its CO are ready for action. The U.S. Navy’s Basic Phase does not.

Lastly, PLAN basic training places much heavier emphasis on training ship crews under “realistic” combat conditions. The aim is to force sailors to demonstrate competence in unpredictable circumstances, under stress, and against “blue” aggressor forces enlisted for the purpose. Except for a 2-3 day capstone Final Battle Problem, reserved until the end of Basic Phase training, the U.S. Navy does not prioritize training under realistic conditions until months later, during follow-on training phases.

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Conor M. Kennedy and Daniel Caldwell, The Type 075 LHD: Development, Missions, and Capabilities, China Maritime Report 23 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, October 2022).

About the Authors

Conor M. Kennedy is a research associate at the China Maritime Studies Institute in the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. He received his MA from Johns Hopkins University-Nanjing University for Chinese and American Studies. His work focused on PLA amphibious warfare, civil-military fusion, and Chinese maritime affairs.

Daniel Caldwell CDR, USN (ret) is a retired Surface Warfare Officer with 28 years of service. His shore tours have included planning billets with CJTF-HOA, COMPACFLT, USINDOPACOM, and the Joint Staff J5. He has served as a Professor of Joint Military Operations and is the former Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College.

This report reflects the authors’ personal views only. The authors would like to thank LtCol Marshalee Clark, USMC, Roderick Lee, CDR Timothy Drosinos, USN, and Col James “Jay” Schnelle, USMC, for their helpful insights during the course of producing this report. Any errors or omissions are the authors’ alone.

Summary

When the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) commissioned its first Type 075 class Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) in April 2021, it represented an important advance in power projection capability for China’s maritime forces. For the first time, the PLAN had an amphibious warship capable of hosting significant rotary wing forces while acting as the flagship for an amphibious task force. Now with three Type 075 class ships either in or soon to be in service, the PLAN has expanded its amphibious capability even further. The Type 075’s dedicated aviation support capability, ability to conduct wet well operations, and expanded command and control and medical facilities reflect capabilities that previously did not exist within the PLAN amphibious fleet. With the Type 075 LHD, the PLAN clearly intends to bolster its ability to project power from the sea in order to protect China’s overseas interests, but will require time for amphibious task forces to become fully proficient.

Introduction

With the 2007 commissioning of the Type 071 Landing Platform Dock (LPD), the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) sought to attain an amphibious platform capable of power projection operations far from Chinese shores. The construction of the Type 075 Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD)—the first of which was commissioned in April 2021—is further evidence of the PLAN’s desire to incorporate a truly first-rate amphibious capability into its force structure.

Although a number of nations developed, constructed, and deployed modern amphibious forces throughout the 20th Century, it was the United States Navy (USN) along with the United States Marine Corps (USMC) during the Second World War that set the standard of amphibious doctrine, capacity, and capability. Since the mid-2000s, the PLAN has sought to emulate the success of the USN/USMC team and has made remarkable strides in this direction with the construction of major amphibious platforms, the most impressive of which is the Type 075 LHD.

In the post-World War II era, the USMC explicitly made the connection between ground and air arms with the development of the Marine Air Ground Task Force. The doctrine that was developed relied on the integration of helicopters for the insertion of troops as well as fixed-wing attack aircraft to provide close air support to landing forces. Beginning in the mid-1950s, the USMC began developing requirements for a ship that would be capable of carrying up to two thousand Marines (including aviation personnel) and supporting an air component of up to twenty helicopters. This concept culminated in the early 1990s with the development of the Wasp-class LHD.

As the centerpiece of the Amphibious Ready Group concept, LHDs are extremely capable platforms that incorporate both a well deck for the employment of landing craft, including Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCACs), and a flight deck to support both fixed wing and rotary wing operations. For the PLAN, having observed the USN/USMC amphibious operations for decades, the need to develop its own LHD-type vessel as the centerpiece of its amphibious forces was clear. However, although its design was largely inspired by western counterparts, the Type 075 has a number of characteristics particular to the requirements of the PLAN.

This report discusses the development of the Type 075 class LHD, the capabilities it is expected to provide, and the way in which the PLAN may incorporate such a platform into the current force structure and future operations. In particular, it examines the Type 075’s role as the flagship of PLAN future amphibious task forces operating in the far seas. … … …

Conclusion

The advent of the Type 075 is an important first step toward a future expeditionary force and represents “a new-type of amphibious combat force for the navy.” Its arrival signifies a profound shift in the missions, functional roles, and the structure and scale of the PLAN’s landing ship flotillas.197 The ship itself provides the PLAN with the hardware to deploy multi-mission amphibious combat forces into distant waters, enabling more credible responses against threats to national interests.

As a new class of ship, the Type 075 program has advanced quickly, as demonstrated by the rapid assembly, launch, and commissioning of the initial batch of three ships. According to the Hainan’s Political Commissar in August 2022, the ship has completed training in basic subjects (基础课目训练), multi-service arm joint training (多兵种联合训练), and mission-oriented exercises (使命课题演练) in the year since its commissioning. Accompanied by footage of flight deck operations and well-deck operations with PLANMC forces on the Hainan, he claims the ship has reached initial operational capability in carrying out amphibious combat duties.198 While initial operational capability can be measured differently in other navies, the ship’s progress is overall an impressive feat of efficiency in naval systems development. The ship has included some of the latest technologies in PLAN surface ships, but does not introduce any groundbreaking capabilities vis-à-vis other navies. It is most significant as a completely new capability that will challenge the PLAN/PLANMC like never before to operate effectively together. While not covered in this report, a new generation of amphibious assault ship—the Type 076—is also reportedly under development by the 708 Institute.199 Additional amphibious assault ship classes will similarly have an important impact on the overall design and use of amphibious forces.

Many challenges still need to be overcome to make this amphibious force effective in the types of missions envisioned. The PLAN has yet to publicize more complex exercises involving other ships of the fleet or what the full air detachment will look like. More importantly, the PLAN has to date not yet deployed larger scale amphibious forces into the far seas. The USN shed blood and spent decades learning and improving the implementation of expeditionary warfare, making it the best possible reference for PLAN development. Study of the USN has likely benefited the development of the Type 075 program. However, the difficulty of expeditionary operations may negate most of the late-mover advantage the PLAN could muster. Expeditionary operations feature a steep learning curve that starts with planning and execution at home ports and bases. To make future amphibious task forces effective and join the club of powers capable of expeditionary warfare, the PLAN will need to learn the hard way by actually deploying forces and planning and executing operations.

This report seeks a deeper understanding of the Type 075 LHD. It has examined the ship’s development, its various capabilities, and how it fits within the PLAN’s amphibious fleet forces. In this process, a number of PRC/PLA writings were examined, ranging from earlier defense academic studies and official reporting in newspapers to a very active discussion by numerous unofficial experts conducting their own assessments of the final delivered ship. PRC discussions regarding the ship and amphibious task forces are intensely ambitious. Many anticipate deployment anywhere in the world. This report finds that future amphibious task forces centered on the Type 075 will learn to crawl before they can run, a process that will take many years. The current cohort of three ships could sustain a single amphibious task force deployed abroad, and will largely be tasked with lower-intensity, small-scale operations for military diplomacy or to protect national interests.

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Kevin McCauley, Logistics Support for a Cross-Strait Invasion: The View from Beijing, China Maritime Report 22 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, July 2022).

About the Author

Kevin McCauley has served as senior intelligence officer for the Soviet Union, Russia, China, and Taiwan during 31 years in the federal government, as well as an Adjunct at the RAND Corporation. He served on numerous advisory boards and working groups supporting the Intelligence Community, National Intelligence Council, and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. McCauley has traveled extensively throughout the Asia-Pacific region for the government. His publications include “PLA System of Systems Operations: Enabling Joint Operations,” “Cultivating Joint Talent” in the Army War College-National Bureau of Asian Research volume The People in the People’s Liberation Army 2.0, “People’s Liberation Army: Army Campaign Doctrine in  Transition” for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and “Russian Influence Campaigns against the West: From the Cold War to Putin.” McCauley has provided testimony to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on the Joint Logistic Support Force and Logistics Support to Expeditionary Operations. McCauley currently writes on PLA and Taiwan military affairs. He also contributes to the Foreign Military Studies Office and U.S. Army TRADOC’s OE Watch journal.

Summary

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believes that logistics support is one of the key determinants of a successful large-scale invasion of Taiwan. Logistics support includes transport, materiel and oil supply, medical care, search and rescue, logistics infrastructure protection, and maintenance of war materiel reserves. Despite the recognized importance of logistics support, it is likely the PLA does not currently possess the requisite logistics capabilities to successfully support a large-scale amphibious landing on Taiwan and a possible protracted conflict involving the United States and allies. Key deficits include a lack of amphibious ships (both military and civilian), transport aircraft, and war reserves. The PLA also continues to face difficulties with landing the requisite logistics supplies during the critical beach assault phase, constructing maritime transfer platforms or temporary wharves to sustain resupply if intact ports are not rapidly captured, establishing a landing base for logistics operations, maintaining the flow of logistics during on-island combat, and establishing strategic war reserves to support the large-scale operation and possibly prolonged conflict. These problem areas might be resolved with several years of sustained effort and complex training.

Introduction

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believes that logistics support is one of the key elements determining the success of a large-scale joint landing operation. The initial support for the landing assault force and the over-the-shore logistics support are the most difficult and critical logistics delivery missions. The PLA actively conducts research into logistics support for amphibious warfare and has identified many problems requiring resolution before being able to successfully support a large-scale landing operation. The PLA does not currently possess the requisite logistics capabilities including equipment, specialized logistics forces, amphibious ships, transport aircraft, and war reserves to successfully support a large-scale amphibious landing on Taiwan. Extensive logistics exercises and training on multiple mission areas necessary to ensure the successful execution of the complex and difficult logistics support plan do not appear to have taken place.

PLA logisticians consider transport, materiel and oil supply, medical, search and rescue, logistics infrastructure protection, and maintenance of war materiel reserves as the main functions of logistics support in a large-scale campaign including blockade, joint firepower strikes, and island landing operations. Such a conflict could escalate with foreign intervention and chain reaction conflicts initiated by countries taking advantage of Beijing’s initiation of operations against Taiwan. Escalation beyond the island landing campaign would further stress strained logistics capabilities.

The PLA is working to construct a precision, just-in-time logistics capability and incorporate intelligent technologies to improve planning and decision making, and to enable just-in-time support to mobile operational units. The logistics integrated command platform will provide a common operating picture and support a fast and efficient logistics system when fully deployed. Logistics forces rely heavily on the Beidou satellite navigation positioning system for communications and coordinating mobile logistics support to dispersed operational units. The Joint Logistic Support Force is developing multiple networks, databases, and a data cloud platform to support logistics planning and supply to units in combat.

The PLA is expanding its logistics capabilities, including air and maritime transport capabilities. Civil-military integration allows the PLA to leverage civilian assets to support delivery of forces and materiel. The National Defense Mobilization Law of 2010 supports mobilization of national resources and promotes civil-military integration. Logistics mobilization of civilian transportation assets is enabled by the 2017 National Defense Transportation Law, intended to strengthen the integration of military requirements into civilian transportation resources. However, numerous PLA sources detail problems with a lack of suitable civilian ships and aircraft, equipment not meeting military standards, as well as poor training.1

This report examines PLA logistics support for a large-scale invasion of Taiwan. It draws heavily from a 2017 volume entitled Operational Logistics Support, published by the PLA’s All Army Logistics Academic Research Center.2 The primary focus of this book is on logistics support to a large-scale amphibious operation against Taiwan. It is part of a series of logistics  publications intended to support Central Military Commission decision making. This “internal” (内部) publication provides highly detailed information on PLA logistics doctrine and capabilities. It also discusses PLA weaknesses and offers proposals for remedying them. … … …

Conclusion

In sum, the PLA assesses its ability to support a large-scale offensive operation is improving, but weaknesses persist in every mission area. Significant deficiencies exist in transportation and war reserves. Certain circumstances would create additional requirements and stress for logistics. For example, intervention by the U.S. could change the nature of the conflict from a war of quick decision to a protracted war and expand the area of operations. A chain reaction conflict in the South China Sea, Indian border, or the Korean peninsula would require logistics support in additional areas. A blockade, international sanctions, or an embargo would force national mobilization. War materiel reserves and especially oil would need to be stockpiled in advance, along with other strategic materiel and resources. The PLA’s assessment of the characteristics of future war includes dispersed mobile forces and high consumption and destruction rates requiring highly mobile and responsive support units providing just-in-time precision logistics employing a highly integrated command information system.

Logistics command, coordination, and organization of forces is complex. The PLA believes that the repeated reorganization of the logistics forces has caused internal frictions, complex coordination issues, low proficiency, and difficult organizational and command issues affecting response times and the efficiency of wartime logistics support. The dual logistics system with the Joint Logistics Support Force combined with the service logistics system creates command and coordination issues when supporting a large-scale conflict. Adding to the complexity is the need to coordinate with government agencies and civilian enterprises for mobilization, requisitioning, repairs and construction, and transportation. Wartime logistics functional areas establish separate command networks from the strategic to the campaign level that could lead to coordination problems during a dynamic, large-scale operation.96

The lack of a full system-of-systems operational capability linking all the services and branches into an integrated entity creates connection problems between operational command and the logistics system. The PLA assesses that the informationization level remains relatively low in the areas of automation, information systems, and intelligent technologies. The command information system of the logistics forces does not meet requirements for major combat operations. Logistics command information system problems can disrupt logistics plans and missions, adversely affecting operations. These disruptions can hamper communications between command levels, front and rear support elements, and logistics and operational units. To address these issues, the PLA is developing a precision logistics capability based on the logistics integrated command platform to provide just in time support to operational units, but it is unclear how far these efforts have progressed.97 PLA experts believe that each logistics mission area has weaknesses. They argue that the greatest weakness involves the delivery of forces and materiel across the Taiwan Strait to defended beaches without the option of unloading at a port. The landing stage would see the highest destruction rates and the heaviest consumption of ammunition and petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL). The PLA plans to establish floating transfer platforms and temporary wharves to enable civilian ships to support the logistics force. Enemy strikes, weather, tides, and beach conditions add to the difficulty of this operation.

The PLA regards mobilization of civilian shipping and aircraft as a problem, despite the guidance of the National Defense Mobilization Law and National Defense Transportation Law. Civilian maritime, air, and ground transportation do not adequately meet military requirements. Civilian crews are not trained for combat operations, and there is limited training with the PLA under large-scale combat conditions.

The lack of war materiel reserves presents another significant impediment to supporting a large-scale offensive operation. War reserves have been established to support disaster relief and internal stability operations. They are not stocked to support modern forces, weapons, and equipment in a large operation. Much of the materiel is old and stocked with parts for demobilized equipment. The PLA’s modernization requires replacement of older reserve equipment and spare parts to support the modern equipment now deployed in the force. The current depot system is not appropriate to support a Taiwan invasion, especially if the conflict were to become protracted. Stockpiling oil and other strategic resources would be necessary in the event of escalation and protracted war.

Search and rescue, medical support, and evacuation of wounded are important missions that can affect morale. Rescuing casualties at sea will be difficult in a large area of operations with the possibility of poor weather. The PLA assesses maritime search and rescue assets as too few to support a large combat operation. Some areas of medical support are assessed as adequate, but field medical support needs improvement. The PLA is stressing field medical aid in training, but not for a large-scale amphibious operation.98

Infrastructure support is critical for deployment of forces and materiel to embarkation areas. The PLA believes that enemy strikes will damage or destroy key nodes, requiring repairs. The PLA currently lacks the necessary units for transportation protection and emergency repair for the rail, road, air, and waterway transportation systems spread over four Theater Commands. The PLA has inadequate transportation repair forces, with the wartime emergency repair mission depending on local transportation engineering enterprises that are ill-prepared for large-scale  emergency repair operations. PLA experts believe that these problems can be solved by establishing and training local emergency repair teams and reforming the enterprise militia management system. As of 2017, the military had not formed a reliable emergency response plan.99

The PLA assesses that even after years of construction in the main strategic direction (i.e., the area facing Taiwan), infrastructure capabilities still faces problems supporting major combat operations. The PLA believes that airfields and ports have poor layouts and throughput capacity, with inadequate support facilities for new weapons and equipment. In 2017, PLA experts concluded that only 55 percent of the airfields had special railway lines for replenishment of oil, ammunition, and other materiel. The PLA believes many navy ports do not have the capability to support multiple ship types and do not meet the needs of high-intensity combat support. Only Fuzhou, Quanzhou, Xiamen, and some other ports in the warzone have the required heavy lifting equipment. Protection and camouflage of air and naval facilities is considered poor, with more than 80 percent of the airfield and port facilities exposed above ground. Early warning and special aircraft and missile units are not considered well-protected. Transportation lines in the area of operations are vulnerable, containing many viaducts and tunnels that are easily damaged and difficult to repair.100

At this time, PLA logistics capabilities likely cannot support a large-scale invasion of Taiwan. The PLA would have to initiate a significant effort to improve the multiple areas limiting logistics support. Depending on the pace and scale of efforts to improve logistics capabilities, the project would likely take at least several years once started. Such a crash effort could provide early indications and warning of an intention to invade Taiwan. Alternatively, if the PLA maintains a slow methodical approach to logistics modernization it could take at least a decade to achieve a capability to logistically support a large-scale amphibious landing on Taiwan.

***

Lonnie D. Henley, Civilian Shipping and Maritime Militia: The Logistics Backbone of a Taiwan Invasion, China Maritime Report 21 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, May 2022).

About the Author

Lonnie Henley retired from federal service in 2019 after more than 40 years as an intelligence officer and East Asia expert. He served 22 years as a U.S. Army China foreign area officer and military intelligence officer in Korea, at Defense Intelligence Agency, on Army Staff, and in the History Department at West Point. He retired as a Lieutenant Colonel in 2000 and joined the senior civil service, first as Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia and later as Senior Intelligence Expert for Strategic Warning at DIA. He worked two years as a senior analyst with CENTRA Technology, Inc. before returning to government service as Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia. He rejoined DIA in 2008, serving for six years as the agency’s senior China analyst, then National Intelligence Collection Officer for East Asia, and culminating with a second term as DIO for East Asia. Mr. Henley holds a bachelor’s degree in engineering and Chinese from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, and master’s degrees in Chinese language from Oxford University, which he attended as a Rhodes Scholar; in Chinese history from Columbia University; and in strategic intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College (now National Intelligence University). His wife Sara Hanks is a corporate attorney and CEO specializing in early-stage capital formation. They live in Alexandria, Virginia.

This article was cleared for open publication by the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Prepublication and Security Review, DOPSR Case 21-S-1603. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of defense or the U.S. Government. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the DoD of the linked websites or the information, products, or services contained therein. The DoD does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.

Summary

Most analysts looking at the Chinese military threat to Taiwan conclude that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is incapable of invading the island because it lacks the landing ships to transport adequate quantities of troops and equipment across the Taiwan Strait. This report challenges that conventional wisdom, arguing that the PLA intends to meet these requirements by requisitioning civilian vessels operated by members of China’s maritime militia (海上民兵). Since the early 2000s, the Chinese government and military have taken steps to strengthen the national defense mobilization system to ensure the military has ample quantities of trained militia forces to support a cross-strait invasion. Despite ongoing challenges—including poor data management, inconsistent training quality, and gaps in the regulatory system—and uncertainties associated with foreign-flagged Chinese ships, this concept of operations could prove good enough to enable a large-scale amphibious assault.

Introduction

Discussion of a potential Chinese military invasion of Taiwan almost always hinges on whether the PLA has enough lift capacity to deliver the would-be invasion forces across the Taiwan Strait and, to a lesser extent, whether it could sustain them once they are ashore on Taiwan. The argument centers on People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) amphibious landing ships and other over-the-shore amphibious assault assets, with most observers concluding that the PLAN has not built enough of these ships and therefore that the PLA cannot (yet?) carry out a full-scale invasion.

This report argues that the PLA plans to rely heavily on mobilized maritime militia forces operating requisitioned civilian shipping as the logistical backbone of a cross-strait landing operation, including both the delivery of PLA forces onto Taiwan and logistical sustainment for the PLAN fleet at sea and ground forces ashore. Moreover, the PLA does not regard civilian shipping as a stopgap measure until more PLAN amphibious shipping can be built, but as a central feature of its preferred approach.

The report will examine China’s extensive system for preparing and generating this support force, the roles it will undertake in an invasion operation, and the challenges that must be overcome if the plan is to succeed.

The Scope of the Problem

Most authors looking at the Chinese military threat to Taiwan conclude that the PLA cannot land enough forces on Taiwan to make an invasion viable, that it wil not reach that capability until it builds many more amphibious landing ships, and that doing so will take at least several years even if they accelerate their efforts.2 There has been little detailed analysis to underpin that judgment, at least not in open sources, but most observers assess that the PLA would need to land 300,000 or more troops on Taiwan in total and that the PLAN amphibious fleet can only land around one division, roughly 20,000 troops, in a single lift.3 Since these constraints seem obvious, the logical conclusion is that the PLA must judge itself not yet capable of invading Taiwan.4

The PLA’s prospects appear even worse when one considers the rest of the logistical and operational requirements for a major landing operation, beyond the formidable challenge of getting enough troops ashore quickly in the face of determined resistance. The PLAN auxiliary fleet is inadequate to sustain large-scale combat operations, even if those operations were close to China’s shores as a Taiwan conflict would be. The PLAN has enlisted hundreds of civilian vessels to perform tasks ranging from over-the-shore logistics to at-sea replenishment, emergency repair and towing, medical support, casualty evacuation, and combat search and rescue, suggesting that its own inventory of support ships falls far short of what it deems necessary for a landing campaign.5 Skeptics will argue that this is more proof that the PLA itself does not take the invasion option seriously. The contrary view presented here is that the PLA does take these requirements seriously, but that it intends to rely on maritime militia support for large-scale combat operations, and specifically for a Taiwan invasion campaign.

The maritime militia (海上民兵) has attracted considerable attention in the past decade, led by the efforts of Andrew Erickson and Conor Kennedy at the U.S. Naval War College, focused mainly onits role in supporting China’s claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea.6  Kevin McCauley and Conor Kennedy have also looked at the role of civilian ships in military  power projection outside East Asia.7

What has received much less Western attention is the maritime militia’s role in large-scale combat operations, despite Chinese authors having written extensively on it since the PLA began serious consideration of a Taiwan invasion in the early 2000s. The Nanjing Military Region Mobilization Department director Guo Suqing observed in 2004 that a cross-strait island landing campaign would require large amounts of civilian shipping.8 He noted that there were many suitable ships available, some of which had already been retrofitted for wartime use, but warned that “the traditional form of last-minute non-rigorous civilian ship mobilization can no longer meet the needs of large-scale cross-sea landing operations.” Wang Hewen of the former General Logistics Department’s Institute of Military Transportation noted that efforts to strengthen the  retrofitting of civilian vessels for military use had accelerated in 2003,9 and a 2004 article from the Shanghai Transportation War Preparedness Office outlined the retrofitting work underway there.10 In 2004, Zhou Xiaoping of the Naval Command College called for overhaul of the mobilization system, arguing that “if the traditional administrative order-style mobilization and requisition methods were still followed, it would be difficult to ensure the implementation of civilian ship preparation and mobilization.”11 The government and PLA acted on these concerns, and over the past twenty years the maritime militia has evolved into a major force multiplier for the PLAN in large-scale combat operations.

Operational Roles for the Maritime Militia in a Taiwan Invasion

Kennedy and Erickson have written at length on the militia’s peacetime mission to assert China’s maritime claims, centered on fishing boats that may or may not do any actual fishing. The militia forces discussed here are very different, encompassing large-capacity commercial vessels including container ships, general cargo ships, bulk carriers, tankers, roll-on-roll-off (RO-RO) ferries, barges, semisubmersibles, ocean-going tugboats, passenger ships, “engineering ships,” and others, as well as smaller vessels.13 Authors from the Army Military Transportation University noted in 2015 that the force consisted of over 5,000 ships organized into 89 militia transportation units, 53 waterway engineering units, and 143 units with other specializations.14

Unlike the U.S. Merchant Marine model, where government officers and crews take control of leased ships, Chinese maritime militia units are composed mostly of the regular crews of the mobilized ships, what the Central Military Commission (CMC) Militia and Reserve Bureau director called the “model of selecting militiamen according to their ship” (依船定兵模式).15 The close correlation between requisitioned ships and militia units is essential for integration into military operations. There need to be clear command relationships with the supported PLA units,  and the crews need to be trained on their operational tasks, not to mention the increasingly important issue of legal rights and obligations in wartime. Local or provincial mobilization officials negotiate the requisitioning terms with the ship owners, either large shipping companies or individual owners, while the crews are inducted into militia units by a process that is not explained very clearly in the available writings. Several articles note that some militiamen are not enthusiastic about their role.16

PLA sources cite a wide range of wartime functions for the maritime militia. In a Taiwan invasion scenario, they include the following:

• Delivery of forces. The most obvious operational role for militia units is to carry forces to the battlefield, referred to as “military unit transportation and delivery” (部队运输投送). PLA sources list this as a primary role for civilian shipping, to include participating in the assault landing phase of the operation.17 There are several delivery modes contemplated, the most straightforward being through existing ports. A 2019 article on amphibious heavy combined arms brigades in cross-strait island landing operations noted that as part of the first echelon ashore, one of their most important tasks was to create the conditions for second echelon units to land through operations such as the seizure of ports and piers.18 Articles published in 2014 and 2019 on amphibious landing bases made the same point and included rapid repair of piers among the main tasks to help the second echelon get ashore.19 Other landing modes include lightering from cargo ships to shallow-draft vessels; semisubmersible vessels delivering amphibious vehicles or air-cushion landing craft;20 and RO-RO ships delivering amphibious forces to their launching point or directly to shore.21
• At-sea support. The PLAN has only a few replenishment ships, not enough to sustain the huge number of vessels that would be involved in a cross-strait invasion.22 Given the relatively short distances for a Taiwan landing, most PLAN ships would likely rely on shore-based support, but the service envisions using militia ships for at-sea replenishment as well, including fuel tankers and cargo ships fitted with equipment for alongside replenishment and helipads for vertical resupply.23 Militia ships would also provide emergency services including towing, rapid repair, firefighting, search and rescue, technical support, and even personnel augmentation to replace casualties aboard navy ships.24
• Over-the-shore logistical support. A discussion of logistical support in island landing operations noted the importance of fuel tankers laying pipelines to support forces ashore.25 The author did not specify maritime militia in this role, but given the prominence of tankers in other discussions of militia support, it seems likely they would take part in this activity as well. Requisitioned cargo ships will also play a major role in logistical support through captured ports or via lighters and barges to expedient floating docks.
• Medical support. The PLAN’s fleet of hospital ships could be overwhelmed by the casualties involved in a major landing operation. Militia would augment this force with containerized medical modules deployed on a variety of commercial ships, as well as smaller vessels providing casualty evacuation and first aid.26
• Obstacle emplacement and clearing. Several sources list emplacing and clearing mines and other obstacles among maritime militia tasks in a landing operation, without providing much further detail.27
• Engineering support. Maritime militia forces will not be passively waiting for first echelon units to open damaged ports. Tugboats, barges, salvage ships, crane ships, and dredgers will join the effort to clear obstacles, open channels, and repair docks and other facilities.28
• Reconnaissance, surveillance, and early warning. While much of this discussion has focused on large ships, the huge fleet of militia fishing boats would have a large role in a Taiwan operation as well, providing eyes and ears across the entire maritime theater.29
• Deception and concealment. One major advantage the PLAN derives from having hundreds of militia ships in the battlespace is the ability to hide its most valuable platforms among the radar clutter. Many sources list deception, camouflage, and feints among the militia’s tasks. One 2018 article explains that militia ships will “use corner reflectors, false radio signals, false heat sources, etc., to set up counterfeit ships, missiles, fighters and other targets on the sea … to cause the enemy to make wrong judgments and lure the enemy into attacking the false target.”30 Flooding the strait with false targets would severely complicate Blue efforts against the invasion fleet.
• Helicopter relay platform. The Taiwan Strait is relatively narrow, but a two-hundred-mile round trip each sortie still creates a significant strain for helicopter operations. Some militia ships will serve as “helicopter relay support platforms” (直升机中继保障平台), fitted with helipads, ammunition storage compartments, aviation fuel bladders and refueling equipment, limited repair facilities, and flight control support systems to keep the helicopters in the fight.31 … … …

Dennis J. Blasko, The PLA Army Amphibious Force: Missions, Organization, Capabilities, and Training, China Maritime Report 20 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, April 2022).

This report examines the amphibious forces of the PLA Army and their preparations for large-scale amphibious operations, particularly concerning Taiwan.

About the Author

Dennis J. Blasko is a retired Army Lieutenant Colonel with 23 years of service as a Military Intelligence Officer and Foreign Area Officer specializing in China. He was an Army Attaché in Beijing and Hong Kong from 1992–96. He served in infantry units in Germany, Italy, and Korea and in Washington at the Defense Intelligence Agency, Headquarters Department of the Army (Office of Special Operations), and the National Defense University War Gaming and Simulation Center. Blasko is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School. He has written numerous articles and chapters on the Chinese military, along with the book The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, second edition (Routledge, 2012).

Summary

The PLA Army’s (PLAA) amphibious units would serve as the core of any joint force charged with invading Taiwan. As a result of the 2017 reforms, the PLAA now possesses six amphibious combined arms brigades distributed across three group armies (the 72nd, 73rd, and 74th). During a cross-strait invasion, these brigades would likely receive support from other elements of the group armies to which they belong. This could include fire support, air defense, air transport, aerial fire support, and electronic warfare/cyber-attack. Due to its large composition of two-year conscripts, the PLAA amphibious force has traditionally spent the first four months of every year developing basic individual and team skills, although a recent shift to a twice-a-year conscription cycle could allow for more complex training throughout the year. An analysis of the available reporting on 2021 training events indicates that amphibious training occurs frequently from March to October but mostly involves units at or below the battalion level. Despite efforts to bolster the PLAA’s amphibious capabilities, the force currently lacks the capacity to execute a large-scale assault on Taiwan.

Introduction

One of the most important missions assigned to the People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA) is to provide forces equipped and trained to enhance China’s military posture to deter further steps toward Taiwan independence. All four services, the PLAA, PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), plus the Strategic Support Force and Joint Logistic Support Force, have a role in this effort. If deterrence fails, one military option available to the senior Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership is to order the PLA to conduct an extremely difficult and complex operation known as a joint island landing campaign, which would be supported by a joint firepower campaign. Although a traditional over-the-beach amphibious landing likely will not be the first military course of action to be undertaken in a campaign directed against Taiwan, the PLA is clearly preparing for this possibility should other options fail.

The core of the PLAA’s contribution to the Taiwan deterrence and warfighting missions resides in six amphibious combined arms brigades (ACAB) assigned, two each, to the three group armies stationed closest to Taiwan in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands (TC). Reforms undertaken since 2017, including increasing the capabilities and capacities of PLAA helicopter units and special operations forces (SOF), long-range multiple rocket launchers and air defense weapons, and non-kinetic electronic warfare and cyber-attack units, have greatly expanded the options available to PLAA commanders to conduct joint island landing and joint firepower campaigns.

If ordered to conduct operations against Taiwan or its offshore islands, the six amphibious combined arms brigades will work in concert with elements of their parent group armies and theater commands in an operation that likely will be reinforced by additional Army units from outside the region. Any PLAA action against Taiwan will be coordinated with units from the other services and forces and will also involve militia forces and civilian assets in support. The dispersion of forces in peacetime, however, will require days, if not weeks, to move and assemble units within striking range of Taiwan and prepare them for launching an assault.

Once these forces are ashore, Taiwan’s topography is not optimal for rapid, large-scale offensive, mechanized movements. Only a few beaches along its west coast are suitable for amphibious landing and behind them the terrain soon becomes mountainous and checkered with rice paddies and urban sprawl. Given the restrictions imposed by the terrain, the PLA leadership perhaps sought to modernize PLAA capabilities, as well as capabilities in the other services, to shift the decisive phase of a joint island landing campaign from a traditional over-the-beach amphibious assault followed by a mechanized ground movement inland to a series of airborne (parachute) or airmobile (helicopter) assault operations to seize ports of entry on the coast, airfields, and other key terrain/objectives closer to the center of gravity of Taiwan’s defenses to allow for the rapid insertion of second-echelon follow-on forces by sea and air.1 Nonetheless, a large-scale assault by multiple amphibious combined arms brigades remains a major component of China’s deterrence posture and any joint landing operation.2

This report first addresses the current status of the PLAA’s amphibious combined arms brigades and the support they are likely to receive from their brother Army units. It then discusses training and examines PLAA amphibious and sea-transport exercises and drills conducted in 2021 involving both amphibious and non-amphibious PLAA units. This analysis is consistent with, and supports, the U.S. Department of Defense’s assessment in 2020 and 2021 that

“Both PLAA and PLANMC [Marine Corps] units equipped for amphibious operations conduct regular company- to battalion-level amphibious training exercises, and the PLA continues to integrate aerial insertion training into larger exercises… The PLA rarely conducts amphibious exercises involving echelons above a battalion, although both PLAA and PLANMC units have emphasized the development of combined-arms battalion formations since 2012.3” … … …

The Airborne Corps is expected to support a cross-strait invasion by penetrating behind enemy lines. During the JILC, the Corps’ role would be to conduct paradrops or landing operations onto Taiwan, facilitated by PLAAF aircraft. Once on island, airborne forces are expected to seize and hold terrain and conduct a variety of operations that support the broader invasion. In recent years, the Corps has reorganized to improve its capability for mechanized maneuver and assault, leveraging the PLAAF’s larger inventories of transport aircraft, particularly the Y-20; improved the sophistication of its training at home; and gleaned insights from abroad via training with foreign militaries, while also supporting the CCP’s and PLA’s broader diplomacy efforts.

That said, key questions remain regarding the extent to which the Corps has solved potential challenges to its ability to successfully conduct airborne operations. These include effectively integrating with similar ground force and marine units, which have overlapping roles; carrying out operations in complex or degraded environments; overcoming the Corps’ lack of relevant combat experience; and delivering sufficient air support and successfully suppressing enemy fires to escort vulnerable transport aircraft behind enemy lines.

To address these gaps, future research can identify the combined arms and joint exercises in which the Corps participates and assess the frequency and complexity of those exercises. Changes to the types of aircraft or helicopter forces from which they operate may provide indications of evolving operational concepts. Also, overseas exchanges and training may offer additional insights into the Corps’ evolving capabilities and focus areas for improvement.

Finally, while this report reviews substantial evidence that the PLA expects its airborne forces to support cross-strait operations, some caution may be warranted.80 Historically, large-scale airborne operations in highly contested environments resulted in significant casualties to airborne units. Risks to airborne forces in modern warfare have only grown; capable opponents today can pose a wide array of threats to airborne forces, as well as to the transport aircraft supporting them.81 The opportunity costs of deploying airborne forces into high-end conflict scenarios—particularly if air dropped—may therefore be significant, given that transport aircraft can perform an array of other valuable missions. While there is no indication that the PLA is radically rethinking roles for the Airborne Corps, a 2020 commentary by a PLAAF Command Academy researcher took an expansive view of the Corps’ future roles, describing the PLA’s airborne force as “strategic fists” that can not only support major conflicts central to a country’s national security, but also to “defend national interests and expand [the country’s] national security space on a global scale.”82 It is possible that the PLA will increasingly seek to leverage airborne forces for a broader array of operations farther afield and in less contested environments.

John Chen and Joel Wuthnow, Chinese Special Operations in a Large-Scale Island Landing, China Maritime Report 18 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, January 2022).

About the Authors

John Chen is Chief of Data Solutions and a Lead Analyst at Exovera’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, where he works on foreign policy, national security, and S&T issues using Chinese-language sources. He is also a Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. He holds degrees from Dartmouth College and Georgetown University.

Joel Wuthnow is a senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs within the Institute for National for Strategic Studies (INSS) at the U.S. National Defense University. His research areas include Chinese foreign and security policy, Chinese military affairs, U.S.-China relations, and strategic developments in East Asia. In addition to his duties in INSS, he also serves as an adjunct professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Click here to read a curated compilation with summaries of Dr. Wuthnow’s major published works.

Summary

PLA special operations forces (SOF) would likely play important supporting roles in an amphibious assault on Taiwan. Their capabilities and training are geared towards several missions undertaken during the preparatory and main assault phases of the landing, including infiltration via special mission craft and helicopter, reconnaissance and targeting, obstacle clearance, strikes and raids, and extraction missions. While PLA SOF have made progress in recent years, several longstanding challenges could affect their performance in an island landing: integrating advanced special mission equipment for complex and dangerous missions, coordinating their operations with non-SOF supporting and supported forces, and overcoming the Chinese military’s penchant for centralized command. Even if PLA SOF are only partially effective, however, their support to the main assault force could diminish Taiwan’s ability to defend itself from a large-scale invasion.

Introduction

One important but sometimes overlooked factor that will influence the success of a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attempt to seize Taiwan is special operations forces (SOF) support to the main assault force.1 Special operations have contributed to amphibious assaults in several modern campaigns, including Normandy (1944), the Falkland Islands (1982), and Grenada (1983). U.S. joint doctrine for amphibious operations continues to assign SOF multiple roles, including military information support, civil-military operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, special reconnaissance, direct action, and preparation of the environment.2 During the preparatory and primary landing phases of a Taiwan invasion, and even during a potential “mop up” campaign against resistance fighters, the PLA would likely utilize SOF for similar purposes.3 Depending on their performance, these forces could enable or frustrate the operations of conventional PLA units, or perhaps have no effect at all.

This report addresses the potential role of PLA SOF in a Taiwan campaign from three perspectives.4 First is doctrine. By analyzing authoritative PLA publications, including the Lectures on the Science of Special Operations, we find that PLA SOF are assigned three roles, including a primary role in special reconnaissance and secondary roles in strikes/raids on key targets and in information operations. Second is force structure and capabilities. The PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Air Force (PLAAF), PLA Army (PLAA), and People’s Armed Police (PAP) all possess SOF relevant to a Taiwan contingency, including some forces that have expanded in recent years. The PLA has also acquired special mission equipment relevant to amphibious missions, such as underwater personnel delivery systems. Third is training. Based on PLA print and television media reports, PLA SOF have focused on squad-level and individual skills training, but there is also evidence of SOF involvement in larger combined-arms exercises. However, we found that joint training is limited, and there is almost no open-source evidence of SOF actively preparing for information operations.

The PLA has worked steadily over the last decade to ready SOF for an island landing scenario by refining doctrine, bolstering capabilities, and improving training. However, there are several variables that will influence these units’ performance, including their technical proficiency and potential greater use of unmanned systems, which could replace humans in some roles but increase technical proficiency requirements; degree of jointness, including the need for larger and more frequent exercises with non-SOF units and continued reforms to joint command structures at and below the theater level; and the degree to which commanders try to micromanage SOF activities on the battlefield, which could lead to suboptimal results if those forces hesitate to act without explicit approval. The Taiwan and U.S. defense establishments should work to evaluate these challenges and weaknesses and determine whether plans for Taiwan’s defense adequately consider PLA SOF. … … …

Conclusion

… While not discussed in Chinese doctrinal sources, it is also likely that PAP or other special forces would remain on Taiwan following a successful landing to conduct counterinsurgency-type missions. One area where doctrine may still be ahead of practice is information operations. It is unclear from open-source reports that SOF are preparing for on-island propaganda work, or are training with other relevant PLA units, including the SSF, for this mission.

While PLA SOF have made progress in recent years, several variables will influence their performance in an island landing. One is whether SOF can field and integrate better special mission equipment for complex and dangerous missions. While China’s defense industry undoubtedly continues to improve manned special mission equipment for SOF, researchers have also stressed the utility of unmanned undersea and aerial vehicles for dangerous special operations like mine and obstacle clearing.91 Coordination and effective application of unmanned systems will call for more demanding training and recruitment requirements within PLA SOF.

Another variable is whether SOF can effectively coordinate their operations with non-SOF supporting and supported forces. How much coordination is necessary would likely vary by unit composition and mission type. SOF units with a diverse range of organic capabilities, specialized hardware, and dedicated support units may require less joint coordination than units tasked to accomplish special operations in which the mission rather than the unit is defined as “special.” Elite commando units like the U.S. Navy’s SEAL Team Six with dedicated transport and intelligence support units may require little interaction with main landing forces, but others, such as brigade-sized army units that would deploy alongside and directly support the main landing forces, may need to coordinate more extensively. In the latter case, which appears to describe the majority of the PLA’s SOF units, the lack of permanent joint structures below the theater level could diminish the effectiveness of joint operations involving special forces, potentially leading to catastrophic results similar to the failed U.S. hostage rescue attempt in Iran during Operation Eagle Claw.92 Moreover, some relevant units, including from the SSF, PAP, and Airborne Corps, are outside the theater structure, leading to questions about joint command even at that level. Evidence that these potential shortcomings are being addressed would be inclusion of Airborne Corps and PAP SOF in theater command-led exercises; the establishment of permanent lower-level joint commands or liaison arrangements; and real-world operations, perhaps in counter-terrorism missions within China and farther from home, that would require SOF to learn lessons and adapt.

Chinese special operations would also have to reconcile the imperative for small, clandestine operations behind enemy lines with a desire for unified command under the joint command construct. Generally, there is a tension between the Leninist emphasis on centralization and the need to grant autonomy to lower PLA commanders. This could be especially problematic in special operations: centralized command could lead to poor performance if small units fail to act due to the lack of explicit authorization, or if they are forced to maintain radio communications and thus reveal their positions to the enemy. Evidence from training or updated doctrine could offer signs of whether SOF teams are given adequate autonomy in the field.

Nevertheless, even partially effective special operations could diminish Taiwan’s defenses and thus should be explicitly addressed in defensive concepts. Taiwan’s articulation of a more “asymmetric and innovative” way of defeating an island landing, which has been discussed in recent years under the “overall defense concept” label, should explicitly acknowledge the threat posed by Chinese special operations forces preceding and during all phases of an island landing and determine whether additional changes to tactics and capabilities are needed.93 Those approaches should also identify PLA weaknesses, such as lack of technical proficiency, limited jointness, and potential overreliance on radio communications for command and control, and tailor responses accordingly. It is also worth exploring whether, and how, U.S. SOF may work with their Taiwan counterparts to evaluate the dangers posed by PLA SOF, share best practices, and conduct joint training.94

Tom Fox, The PLA Army’s New Helicopters: An “Easy Button” for Crossing the Taiwan Strait? China Maritime Report 17 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, December 2021).

In this report, U.S. Army Major Tom Fox examines the feasibility of a PLA Army air assault across the Taiwan Strait.

About the Author

Maj. Tom Fox is an aviation officer in the U.S. Army. From 2018 to 2021, he served as an assistant professor of international affairs and Chinese politics in the Department of Social Sciences at West Point. He holds a BSFS from Georgetown University and an MPP from the Harvard Kennedy School. The opinions expressed here are the author’s alone and do not represent the U.S. Military Academy, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. The author would like to extend a special thanks to Dennis Blasko, Kim Fassler, Joel Wuthnow, and John Chen for their helpful guidance in the early stages of research for this project. Nonetheless, the views herein are the author’s alone, and that applies to any errors of fact, omission, or interpretation.

Summary

This report examines the potential roles and missions of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) new rotary wing capabilities in a cross-strait invasion. Looking specifically at the helicopter units of the PLA Army (PLAA), it discusses two possible scenarios in which these forces could serve as the main thrust in a campaign to seize control of Taiwan. In the first scenario, the PLAA would use nearly all of its rotary wing inventory simultaneously to overwhelm Taiwan’s defenses and quickly convince the country’s political leadership to surrender. In a second “unconventional” scenario, the PLAA would risk the destruction of older helicopters in order to launch a sudden attack against the island, thereby achieving the element of surprise while saving its most capable platforms for lengthy follow-on operations to fully subdue the island. Based on analysis of the scale, complexity, and frequency of recent PLAA exercises, this report argues that China is at best a decade away from having the ability to seize Taiwan by either approach.

Introduction

China watchers have long paid close attention to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernization efforts, which have gone on more or less continuously since Deng Xiaoping included them as one of his Four Modernizations. While much academic and media coverage of this process has understandably focused on high dollar and high technology platforms like fighter jets, submarines, and aircraft carriers, the PLA has also made significant investments in updating its rotary wing capabilities. Not only has the PLA developed and acquired more different types of advanced helicopters, but it has also bought more of them, evolved their organizational structure, and trained their pilots and aircrews to feature these capabilities more prominently. Due to the historical centrality of Taiwan “reunification” and recently increased cross-strait tensions, these developments beg the big question: how might these new helicopters help the PLA invade Taiwan?

This report seeks to answer that question, focusing specifically on the rotary wing capabilities of the PLA Army (PLAA). It proceeds in four parts. Part one explores the new rotary wing capabilities by analyzing the helicopters themselves, the organizations fielding them, and the training and doctrine for their employment. Part two focuses on scenario development. It presents two possible approaches that the PLAA might use to leverage these new capabilities in a Taiwan invasion. Part three provides an assessment of the PLAA’s current readiness to play the roles envisioned in the two scenarios. Part four turns to Taiwan’s options for responding to these developments and how best to counter the PLA’s increased capabilities. This report focuses on changes within the PLAA’s Aviation Corps. While rotary wing capability development has also improved the PLA Navy’s (PLAN) options for anti-submarine warfare and amphibious operations, the bulk of significant change has occurred within the PLAA. With these new capabilities, a massive cross-strait air assault may look like an “easy button” to avoid the notorious difficulty of amphibious operations. This report argues that the PLAA currently lacks the capabilities needed to serve this function in a cross-strait invasion scenario. … … …

Conclusion: Not an “Easy Button,” Yet

The PLAA has developed significant rotary wing capabilities in the last decade, and it appears poised to make even greater gains in the next decade judging by its continued fielding of new helicopters and commitment to training for the complexity of modern battlefields. While it takes a long time to build pilot, aircrew, and unit proficiency and even longer to integrate that capability with ground brethren and the joint force, PLA watchers should continue to closely follow developments in this space. In theory, they could eventually become a game-changer for the military balance across the strait, but they are not that yet. The PLA might decide to test these new capabilities on a softer target like Kinmen or Matsu islands,51 although that comes with significant political risk, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this analysis. From solely a military perspective, those islands are much harder for Taiwan to defend due to the extremely favorable geography (small size and proximity to the mainland) for the PLA.

In the final analysis, all cross-strait military scenarios depend significantly on the political circumstances in which they would play out. Air assault operations to cross the Taiwan Strait represent a new development and present Taiwan with another challenge for defending the island, but not an immediately pressing one and not an undeterrable one. Nonetheless, as the PLA continues to strengthen these capabilities, the CCP will aim to exploit additional political leverage gained by shifting the military balance further in its favor. While deterrence remains possible now and well into the future, the most important variable to watch is the risk tolerance of CCP leaders for bearing the significant casualties that would accompany any attempts to take Taiwan by force. Air assaults are not an “easy button” for the CCP, but in the next decade they will become a more realistic option with lower costs than an amphibious assault. And it could be a button political circumstances tempt CCP leaders to press.

J. Michael Dahm, Chinese Ferry Tales: The PLA’s Use of Civilian Shipping in Support of Over-the-Shore Logistics, China Maritime Report 16 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, November 2021).

Pathbreaking contribution by J. Michael Dahm, a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer and a senior researcher at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. Among his Indo-Pacific assignments, he formerly served as Assistant U.S. Naval Attaché in Beijing—& graciously hosted me & my CMSI colleagues there. Check out the revealing accompanying graphics: 47 figures & 7 tables!

The analyses, perspectives, and opinions expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Navy, APL, or APL sponsors.

Summary

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has long provided indications it will use civilian shipping in direct support of a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. To date, however, there has been little effort to gauge the PLA’s actual ability to leverage China’s commercial fleet in the most challenging part of any such campaign—operations over-the-shore. Drawing from ship tracking data, satellite imagery, media reporting, and the writings of PLA experts, this report analyzes recent military-civil fusion exercises and training to assess current capabilities. A PLA exercise in summer 2020 indicates significant developments in the use of new technologies by select Chinese-flagged merchant ships for over-the-shore logistics support to amphibious operations. In 2021, the PLA also demonstrated the use of roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) ferries as auxiliary landing ships in amphibious exercises and tested a new floating causeway that could be used in a large-scale amphibious operation. Notwithstanding these developments, this report concludes that as of 2021, China’s merchant fleet is unable to provide the amphibious landing capabilities or the maritime logistics in austere or challenging environments necessary to have a significant impact in an amphibious landing operation on Taiwan.

Introduction

The PLA will probably not be able to conduct a successful cross-strait invasion of Taiwan until and unless it masters what the U.S. military calls joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS). While “JLOTS” is not a term Chinese military authors typically use, they have nevertheless considered how the PLA should conduct logistical support immediately after a large-scale amphibious assault and have commented on such capabilities the PLA may require. These capabilities include unloading in rudimentary or damaged port facilities; using temporary piers or wharves to offload vehicles and supplies directly to shore; and unloading cargo ships, including RO-RO ships, at-sea and then lightering materiel to a captured port or beachhead.

PLA authors uniformly assert that civilian ships, working closely with the military, will be an integral component of any major cross-sea logistics operation, including over-the-shore operations. In recent years, the PLA has conducted a number of exercises to bolster military-civil fusion (MCF) in amphibious operations. To what extent have these exercises helped develop the JLOTS capabilities needed for a Taiwan invasion?

This report sheds light on this vital question by carefully examining MCF exercises in 2020 and 2021. In the summer of 2020, the PLA’s Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF) conducted a complex, large-scale maritime logistics exercise in China’s Eastern Theater, the military theater that would be responsible for a cross-strait invasion. Taking place in Lianyungang, Jiangsu province, the exercise— called EASTERN TRANSPORTATION-PROJECTION 2020A—featured the JLSF working closely with a large number of substantial civilian RO-RO ferries, cargo ships, tugs, and construction vessels as well as PLA landing craft in an amphibious logistics exercise that became increasingly complex over two months. While the PLA did not repeat this exercise in the summer of 2021, it did conduct unit-level training in the Southern Theater Command and a large exercise in the Eastern Theater Command. These amphibious exercises appeared to move beyond benign logistics or the deployment of second echelon forces in amphibious landing areas. They saw civilian RO-RO ferries working in concert with larger PLA Navy (PLAN) amphibious assault ships, deploying first echelon forces offshore in beach landing operations. In September 2021, the PLA also tested and evaluated a new floating causeway system, an effort to improve on a modular floating pier showcased in 2020.

This report integrates open-source media reports with ships’ tracking data from automatic identification system (AIS) terminals and commercial satellite imagery to reconstruct the 2020 and 2021 MCF exercises. Based on an in-depth analysis of the events, the report offers the following conclusions about the PLA’s capabilities to conduct amphibious operations using civilian ships as a core component of a large-scale amphibious operation:

• As of 2021, the PLA and its reserve civilian merchant fleet are probably unable to provide significant amphibious landing capabilities or the maritime logistics in austere or challenging environments necessary to support a large-scale, cross-strait invasion of Taiwan.
• The PLA’s use of civilian shipping in amphibious exercises appears to be limited to select ships demonstrating nascent capabilities, but not the capacities necessary to support a cross-strait invasion. However, capacities could increase rapidly after initial capabilities are formally adopted and exercise participation expands to a larger number of civilian ships.
• 2020-2021 exercise events appeared to be scripted and focused on establishing procedures and coordination among military units and civilian components.
• The 2020 JLSF exercise featured experimentation with a number of novel logistics capabilities that have been slow to develop and have likely not yet matured probably due to a lack of investment. In a possible change in that trend, 2021 activity saw the introduction of the first new amphibious landing technologies in over fifteen years.
• In most cases, civilian shipping support to amphibious exercises was provided during daylight hours; events were timed for when tides and weather conditions were favorable; many evolutions took place in the sheltered waters of an inner harbor.
• In the 2020 JLSF exercise, there was no evidence of simulated combat conditions during the exercise; no defensive actions (e.g. convoying, escorting, evasion or diversion) were observed. In the 2021 amphibious landing exercises, civilian ferries appeared to be deployed and positioned to mitigate potential threats to these vulnerable ships.
• These 2020-2021 exercises likely provide a baseline for the PLA’s use of civilian shipping to support large-scale amphibious logistics and provide a roadmap for the types of capabilities and capacities the PLA may need for future operations. … … …

Conclusions

As of 2021, the PLA and its reserve civilian merchant fleet are probably unable to provide the maritime logistics in austere or challenging environments necessary to support a cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. Although 2021 exercises employed RO-RO ferries as reserve amphibious landing ships, deploying infantry in assault boats or amphibious armor, this likely represents a very modest augmentation for a potential PLA landing force. Despite concerns that China could bring its vast fleet of merchant ships to bear on an operation to invade Taiwan or conduct some other military operation, there are practical realities that should limit such concerns. The complexity of amphibious operations appears to have limited military-civil fusion to a handful of select ships that provide the PLA with relatively modest capacities.

The apparent increase in civilian ship participation in PLA amphibious exercises may simply reflect the PLA taking advantage of excess RO-RO ferry availability during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the appearance of new amphibious logistics technologies, probably years in the making, suggests otherwise. The continued integration of civilian ships into PLA operations will be telling, especially as exercise participation extends to ships other than the large Bohai Gulf-based ferries. Once procedures have been established and the PLA has gained some experience integrating civilian vessels into amphibious operations, there may be great potential to rapidly scale up the use of civilian ships in combat support or amphibious logistics roles. The expanding roles for merchant ships in military operations may present challenges for China’s adversaries in terms of detecting, targeting, and countering these civilian vessels.

However, scaling up combat and logistics operations can be a challenge that increases geometrically in complexity as numbers of participating forces and volumes increase. Loading and moving eight civilian ships once is very different from loading and moving eighty ships once or, more likely, coordinating dozens of ships to load and move materiel, equipment, and personnel for days or weeks, all while taking enemy fire. In the 2020 over-the-shore logistics exercise, the landing and unloading operations appear to have been completely unopposed. In the 2021 logistics operations, there was also no evidence observed in the tracks of the ships or satellite imagery that the exercise sought to simulate the presence of an enemy force. No defensive actions (e.g. convoying, escorting, evasion or diversion) were observed. However, based on observations of defensive actions taken in the 2021 landing exercises, the PLA and its merchant support fleet may be changing their mindset about putting these ships in harm’s way.

The appearance of a new floating causeway system and landing platform in 2021 indicates that the PLA is investing in better over-the-shore logistics technologies. These platforms could provide the PLA with significant capabilities and access to beach landing areas with military or civilian ships. That said, Project 019 was initiated in 2001 and heralded by the PLA as a major (if not widely known) project to create a capability for at-sea transfer and unloading of materiel and equipment in austere conditions. Prototype capabilities appeared over a decade later. By 2020, it appeared the PLA was still utilizing those same prototype capabilities in Exercise EASTERN TRANSPORTATION-PROJECTION 2020A. Given these long timelines for development and the challenges the PLA may be experiencing with its new floating causeway system, it is unlikely the PLA will rapidly increase its over-the-shore logistics capability in the next several years.

A group of Chinese military authors affiliated with the PLA’s Military Transportation University and the JLSF Transportation and Projection Bureau provide some insights about the state of PLA over-the-shore logistics capabilities. In January 2020, they wrote that the Chinese military’s “dockless unloading equipment” (无码头卸载装备) is essentially a “technical reserve.” Most of the specialized equipment are prototypes, according to these PLA authors. They observe that dockless unloading equipment is usually kept in storage and seldom used, which provides significant challenges for training and procuring the necessary volume of equipment that might otherwise support large-scale operations. In their critique, they conclude, “[The Chinese] military’s dockless unloading is still in its infancy. There are still many weak links.”121 That January 2020 assessment is likely accurate based on detailed observations of Exercise EASTERN TRANSPORTATION-PROJECTION 2020A and 2021 exercise activity. How those nascent capabilities grow in the coming years should be watched closely.

The 2020 and 2021 exercises integrating civilian shipping, especially large RO-RO ferries, may have provided the PLA and its JLSF with a baseline assessment for where the Chinese military is with regard to large-scale amphibious operations and logistics. The lessons learned from the JLSF’s experience over the summer of 2020 may provide a roadmap for the types of capabilities and capacities the JLSF and the larger PLA joint force may need for future operations. Depending on the PLA’s take-aways, one might expect to see what are probably still prototypes like the floating pier system, the new floating causeway, and the new landing platform go through additional experimentation and exercises, possibly leading to large-scale production of these types of capabilities to support multiple landing points in a Taiwan invasion. Similarly, ad-hoc capabilities like deck barges modified into an at-sea RO-RO unloading platform may evolve into tailored systems with features supporting the unique requirements for loading and unloading military equipment from both naval vessels and civilian ships at-sea.

Despite these seemingly negative critiques of PLA amphibious landing capabilities in general, and over-the-shore, “dockless” logistics capabilities in particular, it would be a mistake to underestimate the ingenuity and tenacity of the PLA. An evaluation of these 2020 and 2021 exercises should be considered in the context of a Chinese approach to problem solving rather than a Western opinion about how amphibious logistics should be done. The PLA’s reserve merchant fleet probably does not currently have the capabilities and capacities to support a disciplined, effective, and efficient amphibious operation with over-the-shore logistics in support of a Taiwan invasion. However, efficiency is not necessarily a prerequisite for success, especially for the PLA.

Clearly, the PLA has started to work through what may be required to support an invasion of Taiwan and how exactly that will be done. The Chinese Communist Party can leverage a national mobilization of maritime shipping on a massive scale and the PLA clearly intends to exploit that capability. Such a mobilization of civilian shipping to support cross-strait operations may be very high risk and could involve extremely high losses. However, there is a certain “quality in quantity.” There are few challenges related to efficiency and attrition that the Chinese military could not simply address with overwhelming mass and a tolerance for loss. Future exercises like those explored in this report merit close scrutiny to provide indications of the trajectory of PLA amphibious and logistics capabilities.

Sources and Methods

This report fuses a variety of publically and commercially available sources to gain detailed insights into often complex military activity and capabilities. Analysis is supported with AIS data from MarineTraffic—Global Ship Tracking Intelligence.122 Google Earth images are attributed to the commercial satellite provider and published under the Google Earth terms of service.123 The report also features commercial satellite imagery from Planet Labs Inc., the leading provider of global daily Earth data. Medium-resolution satellite imagery from the PlanetScope constellation (ground sample distance (GSD) ~3.7 meters) was obtained through Planet’s Education and Research Program, which allows the publication of PlanetScope imagery for non-commercial research purposes.124 High-resolution satellite imagery from Planet’s SkySat constellation (GSD ~0.5 meters) was purchased by the author through SkyWatch Space Applications Inc.125 The SkyWatch team’s advice and assistance in accessing archived imagery and tasking satellite collection was greatly appreciated. The author is responsible for all annotations of satellite images contained in this report. Planet Labs retains copyrights to the underlying PlanetScope and SkySat images, which should not be reproduced without the expressed permission of Planet Labs.

Conor M. Kennedy, The New Chinese Marine Corps: A “Strategic Dagger” in a Cross-Strait Invasion, China Maritime Report 15 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, October 2021).

This report discusses the recent expansion/reform of the Chinese Marine Corps in the context of a Taiwan invasion scenario.

Summary

Since 2017, the People’s Liberation Army Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC) has undergone significant expansion, growing from two brigades to eight. The major impetus behind these efforts is a desire to build the service arm into an expeditionary force capable of operating in most environments at short notice. However, PLANMC reform has also bolstered its ability to contribute to major campaigns along China’s periphery, including a Taiwan invasion scenario. This report examines the PLANMC’s role in a cross-strait amphibious campaign and analyzes how new additions to the force could be used against Taiwan. It explores what roles the PLANMC would likely play in the three major phases of a Taiwan invasion: preliminary operations; assembly, embarkation, and transit; and assault landing and establishment of a beachhead. It also examines new capabilities designed for operations beyond the initial beach assault. This report argues the PLANMC is not being configured for a traditional landing operation, but rather is focusing development toward new operational concepts that could provide unique capabilities in support of the larger campaign.

Eric Heginbotham, Chinese Views of the Military Balance in the Western Pacific, China Maritime Report 14 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, June 2021).

Summary

This report examines Chinese views about the military balance of power between China and the United States in the Western Pacific. It argues that while there is no single “Chinese” view on this topic, Chinese analysts tend to agree that 1) the gap between the two militaries has narrowed significantly in recent years, 2) the Chinese military still lags in important ways, and 3) Chinese military inferiority vis-à-vis the U.S. increases the further away it operates from the Mainland. In terms of specific areas of relative strength, the Chinese military has shown the greatest improvements in military hardware, but has farther to go in the area of jointness, training, and other military “software.” Nevertheless, despite continued criticism from senior civilian leaders, training quality has likely improved due to a greater focus on realism, and recent military reforms have, to a degree, improved the prospects for jointness.

Introduction

There is no single Chinese view of the military balance. As in the United States, there are many perspectives, informed by personal biases and access to different source material. Conclusions also differ depending on the specific circumstances of each scenario—the adversary, geography, warning time, casus belli, and early crisis decision making. To the extent that it is possible to generalize, the range of Chinese assessments do not, in aggregate, appear to dramatically differ from professional or informed analyses by Western experts. The Chinese leadership recognizes both the remarkable strides that have been made in modernizing the Chinese military, as well as important continuing weaknesses. Chinese analysts agree with American counterparts that Chinese capabilities are far more formidable immediately offshore than they are in more distant locations.

To an extent, the reason for broad consensus across the Pacific lies in the exchange of ideas between Western and Chinese analysts. Chinese views may be a function of ready access to translated Western analyses, which in turn rely heavily on anecdotes and analyses found in published Chinese sources.

To say that there is general agreement on the balance of power does not imply a complete agreement or identity between Chinese and U.S. views. Systematic biases may affect the assessments of each state, as well as different groups within them. High levels of U.S. operational proficiency, a product of sophisticated training structures and regimes developed after the Vietnam War, may alert some U.S. analysts to factors that may not be considered by Chinese counterparts. Only recently, for example, has “jointness” become a guiding criterion in Chinese military decision making. Similarly, as PLA modernization contributes to an improved understanding of modern war, the analysis of military balance issues has expanded to include greater consideration of dynamic factors in combat. Improved assessment may, in turn, contribute to a more circumspect (i.e., pessimistic) assessment of the balance even as it increases Chinese prospects for overcoming challenges.

This report comprises five main parts. The first section outlines the types of source materials that reflect Chinese views, and the second touches on analytic methods behind Chinese assessments. The third section assesses how Chinese leaders and analysts view the overall balance of power today and its evolution over the last two decades. The fourth section discusses particular areas of perceived strength and weakness in PLA capabilities relative to those of the United States. The fifth section examines how Chinese analysts view the potential future impact of intensified competition with the United States and the latter’s increasingly sharp focus on competition with China. The report concludes with a summary of findings. … … …

Jennifer Rice and Erik Robb, The Origins of “Near Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection”, China Maritime Report 13 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, February 2021).

This report traces the origins and development of China’s current naval strategy: “Near Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection.” Near Seas Defense is a regional, defensive concept concerned with ensuring China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. Its primary focus is preparing to fight and win informatized local wars within the first island chain. Far Seas Protection has both peacetime and wartime elements. In peacetime, the Chinese navy is expected to conduct a range of “non-war military operations” such as participating in international peacekeeping, providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, evacuating Chinese citizens from danger, and engaging in joint exercises and naval diplomacy. In wartime, the PLAN could be tasked with securing China’s use of strategic sea lanes and striking important nodes and high-value targets in the enemy’s strategic depth. Nears Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection is rooted in the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Mao Zedong.

About the Authors

• Jennifer Rice is a senior intelligence analyst with the Office of Naval Intelligence. Her portfolio includes issues of naval strategy, modernization, diplomacy, and force employment. She completed her MA in Security Policy Studies at George Washington University and received a BA in English and Political Science from James Madison University.
• Erik Robb is a senior intelligence analyst with the Office of Naval Intelligence focused on Asian military affairs and DoD contingency planning. Erik received a BA from Yale University in East Asian Studies and an MA from UC San Diego in International Relations. He is also a graduate of the Hopkins-Nanjing Center.
• The views and opinions expressed herein by the authors do not represent the policies or position of the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. Navy, and are the sole responsibility of the authors.

Introduction

In 2015, China publicized its current naval strategy of “Near Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection,” which calls for the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to expand the geographic and mission scope of its operations.1 The strategy retains the PLAN’s longstanding focus on defending China’s mainland from attack and asserting national sovereignty claims, but adds new emphasis to safeguarding China’s economic development and strategic interests by protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and engaging in long-distance security missions. The concept of Far Seas Protection is guiding the PLAN’s transformation into a global navy able to conduct both high-intensity combat operations and a variety of peacetime missions. This transformation is well underway and Beijing likely has established goals for its completion. However, these goals are probably not rigid because of factors beyond China’s control. The pace at which the PLAN completes this transformation will depend on other countries’ willingness to accommodate China’s naval ambitions and on the emergence of new global missions arising from transnational security threats or humanitarian crises. … …

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Intellectual Roots

China’s current naval strategy is rooted in the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Mao Zedong. Although other Western and Chinese thinkers have also informed the PLAN’s strategy, the influence of Mahan and Mao is unmistakable. Far Seas Protection’s emphasis on safeguarding China’s SLOCs and overseas interests echoes Mahan’s thinking about the interdependency of economic prosperity and naval power.24 Mahan believed that a strong nation requires a powerful navy to protect its overseas commercial interests and the SLOCs connecting those interests. He also believed the corollary, that a nation’s commercial interests generate the wealth to fund a powerful navy. Beijing increasingly links China’s future economic development with sea power. As described in one authoritative volume, “the seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace, lasting stability and sustainable development of China… it is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military forces structure commensurate with its national security and development interests.”25 Secure SLOCs are the “lifelines” of China’s economic development.26

Mahan further maintained that the imperative to control SLOCs would cause great powers to compete for “command of the sea,” which he defined as “that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it.”27 A nation that enjoys command of the sea can shield its seaborne trade from enemy disruption. China’s strategy incorporates Mahan’s concepts of command of the sea as well as sea control (these concepts are not identical; sea control is more limited in scope to temporary control of a specific area).28 The PLA has long viewed command of the sea (制海权) as critical to the success of blockade or island landing campaigns against Taiwan. The PLA is now emphasizing control more comprehensively across multiple domains, in light of today’s increasingly complex and informatized operations. “Comprehensive control” (综合控制权) is the ability to control the surface, undersea, air, and space domains and seamlessly integrate the forces operating in these domains through networked information and command systems. 29 In this expanded conceptualization of sea control, the networked systems are every bit as important as the ships and aircraft they are meant to support.

China’s strategy also demonstrates the enduring influence of Mao, whose concept of active defense (积极防御) remains the PLA’s guiding principle.30 Active defense combines strategic defense with campaign offense and is a fluid concept; its focus shifts from defense to offense when conditions are advantageous to do so. Mao recognized that although defense is important, ultimately offense is necessary to bring about victory.31 This concern for the offense resonates with contemporary Chinese strategists. The authors of the 2015 Defense White Paper instruct the PLA to “seize the strategic

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initiative in military struggle.”32 According to the 2013 Science of Military Strategy, future guidance to China’s navy will “elevate offense from the campaign and tactical levels to the strategic level.” China “cannot wait for the enemy to attack,” but rather should engage in “strategic attack activities.”33 Similarly, another source notes that once an “opponent has already set in motion his war machine, and avoiding war is no longer possible…[China] must set in motion [its] war machine to prevent being passively caught up in war” and to control the war’s initiation and escalation.34Although China frames its military power as a means of defense, Chinese leaders and strategists provide the authority to act offensively and proactively to defend its interests. … …

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The PLAN’s Future—Power Projection, Expeditionary Missions, and Nuclear Submarines

The PLAN’s strategy of Near Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection and China’s new priority to defend the maritime domain will likely shape the composition and employment of naval forces for decades to come. Far Seas Protection will require greater emphasis on global power projection and expeditionary capabilities. China’s aircraft carrier force may become one of the most visible aspects of its modern, blue-water force and the PLAN will need to develop new concepts of operations and tactics to enable secure, integrated aircraft carrier task group operations in the far seas. Chinese military experts have advocated for a force of up to six aircraft

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carriers, including nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, by the mid-2030s in order to better accomplish China’s national defense missions and sustain blue-water operations.6

In addition, Far Seas Protection will require the PLAN to refine and enhance its ability to support global expeditionary operations to secure China’s national strategic and economic interests, including defense or interdiction of SLOCs and force projection in littoral areas around the world. China will acquire large, multi-mission expeditionary platforms such as LPDs and LHAs for this purpose. These ships will likely carry out a variety of missions including counter-piracy, troop insertion, and HA/DR and medical response.

As the PLAN continues its effort to “go global” to fulfill the requirements of the new naval strategy in the far seas, Beijing will likely identify additional missions for its nuclear submarine force. The PLAN has already begun to deploy submarines into the Indian Ocean to support ongoing security operations.65 If Beijing wishes to extend the distance or increase the number of its far seas submarine deployments, the PLAN will likely need to acquire additional nuclear submarines because they have greater endurance than conventional submarines, which make up most of China’s current submarine force.

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Beijing’s Timeline to Advance Its Naval Strategy

China likely adheres to a clear timeline for aspects of naval development over which Beijing exerts direct control, such as platform construction and far seas deployments. During his speech to the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, Xi outlined requirements for the PLA to become a mechanized force by 2020, a fully modernized force by 2035, and a “world-class” force by 2050.66 Beijing conveys more specific near-term guidance through its Five Year Plans, which direct research, development, and acquisition, and through the Outline for Military Training.67 Each service of the PLA likely has a force modernization strategy and training plan linked to these directives.

However, certain aspects of Far Seas Protection are outside of Beijing’s control either because they rely on foreign partnerships and cooperation or because they are driven by circumstances. For example, China’s pursuit of overseas basing and port access agreements is opportunistic and depends on the willingness of potential host countries to accommodate the PLAN. Although Beijing might seek to influence favorable responses from these countries through infrastructure investment, diplomatic and military engagement, and other economic incentives, the potential host’s receptivity to China’s naval presence is ultimately beyond Beijing’s control. Furthermore, unless Beijing changes its longstanding aversion to formal alliances, other countries have no binding incentive to aid China during wartime.

Security cooperation efforts similarly rely on regional or international consensus to implement. The UN endorsed international counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, enabling foreign navies to conduct security operations in Somalian waters. Without this type of top-level support, and the underlying security crisis that required action, the PLAN may never have embarked on a continuous far seas mission in 2008. In contrast, since at least 2012 Beijing has publicly called for international support to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, working through the UN, bilateral exchanges, and other forums to open a debate and seek consensus on a cooperative security effort.68 China’s 2015 Defense White Paper pledged to help African countries ensure navigational security in the Gulf of Guinea.69 However, despite these efforts, Beijing has not succeeded in gaining the regional and international support to establish a security coalition in the Gulf of Guinea. The emergence of security threats, international unrest, natural disasters, and other humanitarian crises cannot be predicted or directed, but all of these provide opportunities to engage military forces, often in new ways and in new areas of the world.

Zoe Haver, Sansha City in China’s South China Sea Strategy: Building a System of Administrative Control, China Maritime Report 12 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, January 2021).

China established Sansha City in 2012 to administer the bulk of its territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea. Sansha is headquartered on Woody Island. The city’s jurisdiction includes the Paracel Islands, Zhongsha Islands, and Spratly Islands and most of the waters within China’s “nine-dash line.” Sansha is responsible for exercising administrative control, implementing military-civil fusion, and carrying out the day-to-day work of rights defense, stability maintenance, environmental protection, and resource development. Since 2012, each level of the Chinese party-state system has worked to develop Sansha, improving the city’s physical infrastructure and transportation, communications, corporate ecosystem, party-state institutions, and rights defense system. In effect, the city’s development has produced a system of normalized administrative control. This system ultimately allows China to govern contested areas of the South China Sea as if they were Chinese territory.

Key Findings

• Sansha is responsible for administering China’s maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea on a day-to-day basis from the front lines of the disputes.
• Sansha’s physical infrastructure, transportation, communications, economy, party-state institutions, and defense capabilities form a unified system that continuously strengthens the city’s capacity to exercise administrative control over contested areas of the South China Sea.
• The city uses civilian-administrative means, including maritime law enforcement and maritime militia operations, rather than military force to advance China’s position in the South China Sea disputes.
• The development of Sansha is gradually civilianizing and institutionalizing China’s efforts to control the South China Sea, providing a mechanism to govern contested areas as if they were Chinese territory.
• The city’s development aligns closely with China’s broader strategy in the South China Sea, which aims to consolidate China’s claims while deterring other states from strengthening their own claims. This strategy relies on China Coast Guard (CCG) and maritime militia operations backed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy.
• Military-civil fusion is the guiding principle of the city’s development, which ensures that all aspects of Sansha’s development ultimately serve China’s sovereignty and security interests.
• Improvements to Sansha’s physical infrastructure and transportation, including the construction of a smart microgrid on Woody Island, allow Woody Island and other occupied features to accommodate a growing number of military, civilian, and law enforcement personnel and guarantee the continuous operation of important facilities.
• The development of the city’s communications infrastructure enables local leaders to monitor and govern vast swathes of contested maritime space with ease.
• Sansha’s leaders have systematically mobilized private and state-owned enterprises in support of nearly every aspect of the city’s daily operations and long-term development.
• The expansion of the city’s party-state institutions allows municipal authorities to directly govern contested areas of the South China Sea and ensures the primacy of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interests in local decision-making.
• To defend China’s maritime rights and interests, the city created Sansha Comprehensive Law Enforcement (SCLE), a maritime law enforcement force, and established a new maritime militia force. Sansha has integrated both forces into its military, law enforcement, and civilian joint defense system. Using these capabilities, local leaders physically assert Sansha’s jurisdiction at the expense of China’s neighbors and coordinate joint operations with the CCG.
• Sansha’s system of normalized administrative control is currently strongest in the Paracel Islands. Despite the continuing influence of the central bureaucracies, CCG, and PLA, elements of this system also exist in the Spratly Islands and show signs of expanding.

About the Author

Zoe Haver is a Party Watch Initiative Fellow at the Center for Advanced China Research. Her research focuses on the South China Sea disputes and Chinese economic statecraft. She has worked on Chinese security and economic issues at SOS International LLC, the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS), the U.S. Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, and the Columbia-Harvard China and the World Program. Zoe received her BA in International Affairs from George Washington University. She lived in China for three years, studied Chinese in both Taiwan and China, and is proficient in Mandarin Chinese.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Isaac Kardon and the rest of the China Maritime Studies Institute team for their encouragement and helpful feedback. Moreover, this project would not have possible without generous support from the Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS). Finally, the author thanks Devin Thorne for his valuable contributions.

Jeffrey Becker, Securing China’s Lifelines across the Indian Ocean, China Maritime Report 11 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, December 2020).

How is China thinking about protecting sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and maritime chokepoints in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in times of crisis or conflict? Relying on Chinese policy documents and writings by Chinese security analysts, this report argues that three critical challenges limit the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN’s) ability to project power into the region and defend access to SLOCs and chokepoints, particularly in times of crisis: (1) the PLAN’s relatively modest presence in the region compared to other powers, (2) its limited air defense and anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and (3) its limited logistics and sustainment infrastructure in the region. To address these challenges, Beijing has already undertaken a series of initiatives, including expanding the capabilities of China’s base in Djibouti and leveraging the nation’s extensive commercial shipping fleet to provide logistics support. Evidence suggests that the PRC may also be pursuing other policy options as well, such as increasing the number of advanced PLAN assets deployed to the region and establishing additional overseas military facilities.

Capt. Christopher P. Carlson, USNR (Ret.), PLAN Force Structure Projection Concept: A Methodology for Looking Down Range, China Maritime Report 10 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, November 2020).

Force structure projections of an adversary’s potential order of battle are an essential input into the strategic planning process. Currently, the majority of predictions regarding China’s future naval buildup are based on a simple extrapolation of the impressive historical ship construction rate and shipyard capacity, without acknowledging that the political and economic situation in China has changed dramatically. Basing force structure projections on total life-cycle costs would be the ideal metric, but there is little hope of getting reliable data out of China. A reasonable substitute in shipbuilding is to look at the construction man-hours, as direct labor accounts for 30-50 percent of a ship’s acquisition cost, depending on the ship type, and is therefore a representative metric of the amount of resources and effort applied to a ship’s construction. The direct labor man-hours to build a Chinese surface combatant can be estimated by linking a ship’s outfit density to historical U.S. information. This analytical model also allows for the inclusion of the mid-life overhaul and modernization for each ship, which is a major capital expense in the out years following initial procurement. For the naval analyst examining the Chinese Navy’s future force structure, the outfit density concept provides a tool to evaluate the degree of national effort when it comes to military shipbuilding.

Roderick Lee and Morgan Clemens, Organizing to Fight in the Far Seas: The Chinese Navy in an Era of Military Reform, China Maritime Report 9 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, October 2020). 

CMSI has just published China Maritime Report No. 9, entitled Organizing to Fight in the Far Seas: The Chinese Navy in an Era of Military Reform. Written by Mr. Roderick Lee and Mr. Morgan Clemens, this report discusses the challenges that PLA reform and PLA Navy (PLAN) strategy intend to resolve, highlights key organizational developments within the PLAN that preceded China’s military reform, and discusses the known facts of command and control of PLAN forces operating in the far seas.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been laying the organizational groundwork for far seas operations for nearly two decades, developing logistical and command infrastructure to support a “near seas defense and far seas protection” strategy. In the context of such a strategy, the PLAN’s ability to project power into the far seas depends upon its ability to dominate the near seas, effectively constituting a “sword and shield” approach. Along with the rest of the PLA, the PLAN’s peacetime command structure has been brought into line with its wartime command structures, and in terms of near seas defense, those command structures have been streamlined and made joint. By contrast, the command arrangements for far seas operations have not been clearly delineated and no one organ or set of organs has been identified as responsible for them. While this is manageable in the context of China’s current, limited far seas operational presence, any meaningful increase in the size, scope, frequency, and intensity of far seas operations will require further structural reforms at the Central Military Commission and theater command levels in order to lay out clear command responsibilities.

Timothy R. Heath, Winning Friends and Influencing People: Naval Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics, China Maritime Report 8 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, September 2020). 

In recent years, Chinese leaders have called on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to carry out tasks related to naval diplomacy beyond maritime East Asia, in the “far seas.” Designed to directly support broader strategic and foreign policy objectives, the PLAN participates in a range of overtly political naval diplomatic activities, both ashore and at sea, from senior leader engagements to joint exercises with foreign navies. These activities have involved a catalogue of platforms, from surface combatants to hospital ships, and included Chinese naval personnel of all ranks. To date, these acts of naval diplomacy have been generally peaceful and cooperative in nature, owing primarily to the service’s limited power projection capabilities and China’s focus on more pressing security matters closer to home. However, in the future a more blue-water capable PLAN could serve more overtly coercive functions to defend and advance China’s rapidly growing overseas interests when operating abroad.

Isaac B. Kardon, Conor M. Kennedy, and Peter A. Dutton, Gwadar: China’s Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan, China Maritime Report 7 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, August 2020).

China Maritime Report No. 7 offers a detailed examination of China’s infrastructure project in the port of Gwadar, Pakistan. Written by Dr. Peter Dutton, Dr. Isaac Kardon, and Mr. Conor Kennedy, this report is the second in a series of studies looking at China’s interest in Indian Ocean ports and its “strategic strongpoints” there (战略支点). People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials, military officers, and civilian analysts use the strategic strongpoint concept to describe certain strategically valuable foreign ports with terminals and commercial zones owned and operated by Chinese firms. Gwadar is an inchoate “strategic strongpoint” in Pakistan that may one day serve as a major platform for China’s economic, diplomatic, and military interactions across the northern Indian Ocean region. As of August 2020, it is not a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base, but rather an underdeveloped and underutilized commercial multipurpose port built and operated by Chinese companies in service of broader PRC foreign and domestic policy objectives. Foremost among PRC objectives for Gwadar are (1) to enable direct transport between China and the Indian Ocean, and (2) to anchor an effort to stabilize western China by shoring up insecurity on its periphery. To understand these objectives, this case study first analyzes the characteristics and functions of the port, then evaluates plans for hinterland transport infrastructure connecting it to markets and resources. We then examine the linkage between development in Pakistan and security in Xinjiang. Finally, we consider the military potential of the Gwadar site, evaluating why it has not been utilized by the PLA then examining a range of uses that the port complex may provide for Chinese naval operations.

Peter A. Dutton, Isaac B. Kardon, and Conor M. Kennedy, Djibouti: China’s First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint, China Maritime Report 6 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, April 2020).

This report analyzes PRC economic and military interests and activities in Djibouti. The small, east African nation is the site of the PLA’s first overseas military base, but also serves as a major commercial hub for Chinese firms—especially in the transport and logistics industry. We explain the synthesis of China’s commercial and strategic goals in Djibouti through detailed examination of the development and operations of commercial ports and related infrastructure. Employing the “Shekou Model” of comprehensive port zone development, Chinese firms have flocked to Djibouti with the intention of transforming it into a gateway to the markets and resources of Africa—especially landlocked Ethiopia—and a transport hub for trade between Europe and Asia. With diplomatic and financial support from Beijing, PRC firms have established a China-friendly business ecosystem and a political environment that proved conducive to the establishment of a permanent military presence. The Gulf of Aden anti-piracy mission that justified the original PLA deployment in the region is now only one of several missions assigned to Chinese armed forces at Djibouti, a contingent that includes marines and special forces. The PLA is broadly responsible for the security of China’s “overseas interests,” for which Djibouti provides essential logistical support. China’s first overseas strategic strongpoint at Djibouti is a secure commercial foothold on the African continent and a military platform for expanding PLA operations in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

Daniel Caldwell, Joseph Freda, and Lyle Goldstein, China’s Dreadnought? The PLA Navy’s Type 055 Cruiser and Its Implications for the Future Maritime Security Environment, China Maritime Report 5 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, February 2020).

China’s naval modernization, a process that has been underway in earnest for three decades, is now hitting its stride. The advent of the Type 055 cruiser firmly places the PLAN among the world’s very top naval services. This study, which draws upon a unique set of Chinese-language writings, offers the first comprehensive look at this new, large surface combatant. It reveals a ship that has a stealthy design, along with a potent and seemingly well-integrated sensor suite. With 112 VLS cells, moreover, China’s new cruiser represents a large magazine capacity increase over legacy surface combatants. Its lethality might also be augmented as new, cutting edge weaponry could later be added to the accommodating design. This vessel, therefore, provides very substantial naval capability to escort Chinese carrier groups, protect Beijing’s long sea lanes, and take Chinese naval diplomacy to an entirely new and daunting level. Even more significant perhaps, the Type 055 will markedly expand the range and firepower of the PLAN and this could substantially impact myriad potential conflict scenarios, from the Indian Ocean to the Korean Peninsula and many in between. This study of Type 055 development, moreover, does yield evidence that Chinese naval strategists are acutely aware of major dilemmas confronting the U.S. Navy surface fleet.

Conor M. Kennedy, Civil Transport in PLA Power Projection, China Maritime Report 4 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, December 2019).

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has ambitious goals for its power projection capabilities. Aside from preparing for the possibility of using force to resolve Beijing’s territorial claims in East Asia, it is also charged with protecting China’s expanding “overseas interests.” These national objectives require the PLA to be able to project significant combat power beyond China’s borders. To meet these needs, the PLA is building organic logistics support capabilities such as large naval auxiliaries and transport aircraft. But it is also turning to civilian enterprises to supply its transportation needs.

Ryan D. Martinson and Peter A. Dutton, China’s Distant-Ocean Survey Activities: Implications for U.S. National Security, China Maritime Report 3 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, November 2018).

Today, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is investing in marine scientific research on a massive scale. This investment supports an oceanographic research agenda that is increasingly global in scope. One key indicator of this trend is the expanding operations of China’s oceanographic research fleet. On any given day, 5-10 Chinese “scientific research vessels” (科学考查船) may be found operating beyond Chinese jurisdictional waters, in strategically-important areas of the Indo-Pacific. Overshadowed by the dramatic growth in China’s naval footprint, their presence largely goes unnoticed. Yet the activities of these ships and the scientists and engineers they embark have major implications for U.S. national security. This report explores some of these implications. It seeks to answer basic questions about the out-of-area—or “distant-ocean” (远洋)—operations of China’s oceanographic research fleet. Who is organizing and conducting these operations? Where are they taking place? What do they entail? What are the national drivers animating investment in these activities?

Ryan D. Martinson, The Arming of China’s Maritime Frontier, China Maritime Report 2 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, June 2017).

China’s expansion in maritime East Asia has relied heavily on non-naval elements of sea power, above all white-hulled constabulary forces. This reflects a strategic decision. Coast guard vessels operating on the basis of routine administration and backed up by a powerful military can achieve many of China’s objectives without risking an armed clash, sullying China’s reputation, or provoking military intervention from outside powers. Among China’s many maritime agencies, two organizations particularly fit this bill: China Marine Surveillance (CMS) and China Fisheries Law Enforcement (FLE). With fleets comprising unarmed or lightly armed cutters crewed by civilian administrators, CMS and FLE could vigorously pursue China’s maritime claims while largely avoiding the costs and dangers associated with classic “gunboat diplomacy.”

Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson, China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA, China Maritime Report 1 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, March 2017).

Amid growing awareness that China’s Maritime Militia acts as a Third Sea Force which has been involved in international sea incidents, it is necessary for decision-makers who may face such contingencies to understand the Maritime Militia’s role in China’s armed forces. Chinese-language open sources reveal a tremendous amount about Maritime Militia activities, both in coordination with and independent of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Using well-documented evidence from the authors’ extensive open source research, this report seeks to clarify the Maritime Militia’s exact identity, organization, and connection to the PLA as a reserve force that plays a parallel and supporting role to the PLA. Despite being a separate component of China’s People’s Armed Forces (PAF), the militia are organized and commanded directly by the PLA’s local military commands. The militia’s status as a separate non-PLA force whose units act as “helpers of the PLA” (解放军的 助手) is further reflected in China’s practice of carrying out “joint military, law enforcement, and civilian [Navy-Maritime Law Enforcement-Maritime Militia] defense” (军警民联防). To more accurately capture the identity of the Maritime Militia, the authors propose referring to these irregular forces as the “People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia” (PAFMM).

administrations as well as with members of Congress.5 Previously, as a Taiwan legislator (2002-2008; 2012-2020), she served on the influential Foreign Affairs and National Defense (FAND) Committee.6 7 During this time, Hsiao also held various leadership positions in the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats, Liberal International, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.8 9 She is from the progressive wing of the DPP and a close ally of President Tsai.10

China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a new leader – and he is a Navy guy!

On 29 December, Admiral Dong Jun was appointed China’s 14th Minister of National Defense. Admiral Dong Jun’s impressive career as a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) officer will certainly influence how he executes his new role.

This analysis focuses on Dong’s formative experiences as a naval officer, and their potential implications within the maritime domain; with particular emphasis on Dong’s liaison role – representing the PLA, and ultimately the Central Military Commission (CMC), in interactions with foreign militaries.

Dong’s unprecedented background as the PLAN Commander reflects serious joint and naval focus under Xi with growing potential applications to disputed sovereignty claims in the East and South China Seas—none more important than Taiwan.

But what do you know about Admiral Dong’s Navy career? What assignments have shaped his thinking? What joint experiences does he have that enable him to assume this influential position?

The China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) is pleased to bring you CMSI Note #2, “Admiral Dong Jun Engages Friends and Foes: China’s First Naval Defense Minister Brings Joint Operational Experience.” We are publishing this note just one day after the announcement of Admiral Dong’s appointment to serve as the PLA Minister of National Defense.

“CMSI Notes” are a new product line from the team at CMSI. They are short quick turn analysis of high-profile China maritime events or topics that have critical policy, DoD, and U.S. Navy significance. CMSI Notes are designed to be a timely reference for senior DoD/Navy leaders, warfighters, and policymakers to help inform both near term and future decision-making. I encourage you to read through the attached CMSI note and forward it to those who need to see it today.

This CMSI Note, along with our first note published on 27 December titled, “Admiral Hu to the Helm,” will be posted shortly on the CMSI webpage. Considering this is a holiday weekend (and unlikely to be posted until next week), we encourage you to circulate this note to your distribution lists to ensure the right folks have eyes on to support the inevitable questions about Admiral Dong that will come early next week.

My profuse thanks to Dr. Andrew Erickson and the whole CMSI team who helped pull our second CMSI Note together so quickly. Andrew’s decades of experience and laser focus on China’s Navy enabled our team to get this note to your in-boxes within ~24 hours of the public announcement of Admiral Dong’s appointment.

Very Respectfully,

Christopher H. Sharman

Director

China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI)

中国海事研究所

***

Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher H. Sharman, “Admiral Dong Jun Engages Friends and Foes: China’s First Naval Defense Minister Brings Joint Operational Experience,” CMSI Note 2 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 30 December 2023).

Admiral Dong Jun Engages Friends and Foes:

China’s First Naval Defense Minister Brings Joint Operational Experience

Dr. Andrew S. Erickson and Captain Christopher Sharman, USN (Ret.)[1]

On 29 December 2023, Admiral Dong Jun (董军) was appointed China’s 14^th Minister of National Defense (国防部部长) at the seventh meeting of the Standing Committee of the 14^thNational People’s Congress.[2] He replaced the previously deposed Army General Li Shangfu, ending a four-month leadership gap. Admiral Dong is the first PLA Navy (PLAN) officer to head China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). Previously the 9^th People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Commander, he was likewise exceptional in achieving this position from a background in theater joint operations.[3]

As PRC Defense Minister, Dong lacks operational command over the PLA (the responsibility of the Central Military Commission/CMC and which is operationalized through the Theater Commands).[4] He is instead a diplomat-liaison representing the PLA, and ultimately the CMC, in interactions with foreign militaries. Dong’s unprecedented background as the PLAN Commander nevertheless reflects serious joint and naval focus under Xi with growing potential applications to disputed sovereignty claims in the East and South China Seas—none more important than Taiwan. This analysis therefore focuses on Dong’s formative experiences as a naval officer, and their potential implications within the maritime domain; with particular emphasis on Dong’s liaison role.

CMSI’s Perspectives and Key Takeaways

• Admiral Dong, one of the PLA’s most experienced joint commanders, has deep expertise at the operational level of war.
• His operational assignments in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands provide him with unique understanding regarding PRC sovereignty claims and will make Dong a potent interlocutor with foreign counterparts regarding Taiwan, the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, and South China Sea disputes.
• Within the limits of his position, Dong is likely to advocate for more robust PLA joint integration—especially as it relates to PLA options for Taiwan—based on his experience overseeing PLA joint operations in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands.
• Years engaging foreign counterparts, particularly as PLAN Commander, enhance Dong’s ability to convey China’s strategic goals and objectives to international audiences.
• Dong has engaged extensively with Russian counterparts through naval exercises and high-level communications, highly compatible with China’s growing strategic and security cooperation with Russia.

Career Background

Born in the shipbuilding port city of Yantai, Shandong province, in 1961, Dong entered the Dalian Naval Academy in 1978. A career surface warfare officer, Dong subsequently served in the former East Sea Fleet (now Eastern Theater Command Navy) including as commander of the Naval East Sea Joint Command/92269 Force (海军东海联合指挥部/92269部队) in the Zhoushan Water Garrison District.[5]

From 2007 through end of 2009, Dong served as Director of the Military Training Department of the PLAN Headquarters Department with the grade of Division Leader. In this capacity he almost certainly oversaw the PLAN development and implementation of the 2008 Outline on Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE) (trial in 2008, implemented in January 2009). The OMTE acts as the overarching training guidance document that mandates what training, and how much of it, the PLAN does. This edition remained in effect for a decade until the next series was released in January 2018/2019.[6]

From early 2010 through the end of 2011, Dong served as Director of the Operations Department in the PLAN Headquarters Department with the grade of Division Leader. There, Dong likely played a role in day-to-day oversight of early naval escort task forces to the Gulf of Aden and other day-to-day PLAN operations. From 2012-2013, Dong was one of the North Sea Fleet Deputy Chiefs of Staff with the grade of Corps Deputy Leader. Notably, he acted as the PRC deputy during the first Naval Cooperation exercise with Russia in 2012.^[7] In July 2012, Dong was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral (one-star).[8]

From July 2013 through November 2014 Dong served as one of the Deputy Commanders of the East Sea Fleet as well as Commander of the newly-established East China Sea Joint Operations Command Center (ECS JOCC) (东海联合作战指挥中心) with the grade of Corps Leader.[9] In its first serious foray into joint operations command, the PLA established the ECS JOCC in 2013 as a “special joint operations command headquarters” for PLA operations in the direction of the East China Sea; particularly to coordinate PLAN, PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and potentially China Coast Guard operations in that sea area and the airspace above.[10]

As the first commander of the first PLA joint operations command entity—especially the one that would face immediate requirements in terms of “defending” China’s recently-declared Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)—Dong was presumably scrutinized closely in this capacity. On his watch, PLA command and control constructs and operational forces faced real-world tests; he likely had to direct forces to address U.S. and Japanese activities within the area of responsibility of what would become the Eastern Theater Command in 2016.

From December 2014 through December 2017, Dong served at the PLAN Headquarters Department as one of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff with the grade of Corps Deputy Leader.[11]There his responsibilities likely centered on force modernization, strategy, and training; as well as multifarious meetings and official functions. For example, on 18 August 2015 Dong participated in a PLAN seminar focused on building innovative think tanks in the service.[12] Per standard practice, on 2 March 2016, Dong attended the PLAN’s annual military work meeting at which leadership reviewed previous-year PLAN achievements and current-year requirements.[13] Dong was deeply involved in the Sino-Russian Joint Sea (海上联合) exercise in 2015^[14]and 2016,^[15] serving both times as executive training director (执行导演).

In January 2017 Dong became one of the concurrent Deputy Commanders of the Southern Theater Command and Commander of the Southern Theater Command Navy with the grade of Theater Command Deputy Leader.[16] He was promoted to the rank of Vice Admiral (two-star) in July 2018. Whereas his predecessor oversaw the maritime operations group specifically, Dong likely acted as the principal maritime deputy commander at the physical JOCC, thereby examining how the maritime component fuses with the other components. In this capacity, he was probably involved in key events, including the 2018 Decatur Incident, the 2019 Hong Kong PLA response, and the command’s expanding area of responsibility.[17] He was undoubtedly involved in managing the PLA response to increasing U.S. FONOPS starting in 2017,[18] and presumably was involved in the joint Summer 2020 South China Sea exercise.[19]

Further afield, in March 2017, Dong was part of an official PLA delegation to Malaysia and Saudi Arabia.[20] In October 2017, in a foreshadowing of his own future leadership responsibilities, Dong visited the Philippines as part of a delegation under State Councillor and Defense Minister Chang Wanquan.[21] From December 2019 to January 2020 Dong planned and led as “chief director” the Sino-Pakistani joint naval exercise Sea Guardians 2020.[22]

In March 2021, Dong returned to Headquarters as one of the PLAN Deputy Commanders with the grade of Theater Command Deputy Leader. In August 2021, Dong was named PLAN Commander with the grade promotion of Theater Command Leader. The following month, he was promoted to the rank of Admiral (three-star, the PLAN’s highest rank).[23] Dong subsequently presided over such milestones as the launch of China’s third aircraft carrier, Fujian, in June 2022.[24] From 14-19 December 2022, Dong headed a conclave of the PLAN’s most senior officers. In Ryan Martinson’s analysis, “the six-day training event can be reduced to a single theme: make all necessary preparations to defeat the U.S. Navy in great power war at sea.”[25] On a related note, Dong has been credited with intellectually guiding the requisite “naval talent construction.”[26] He has informed “practical training closely in line with actual combat” in the Eastern Theater Command.[27] Dong headed China’s Navy until 25 December 2023, when he attended a ceremony with Xi Jinping in which command passed to Admiral Hu Zhongming.[28]

Throughout the latter stages of his career, Dong has engaged with many navies, including those of Sweden,[29]Djibouti,[30] the UK,[31] North Korea,[32] Chile,[33] Singapore,[34] and Gulf of Guinea nations.[35] Dong’s longtime interaction with Pakistani and Russian counterparts is particularly significant.[36] He has extensive experience engaging with Russian counterparts through exercises and high-level communications. The tracks with Moscow’s increasing importance as a strategic partner of Beijing, and the great and growing entente that Xi envisions moving forward. Of note, in November 2021, Dong participated in a video call discussing joint Sino-Russian maritime and air joint patrols that year. The other principals were then State Councillor and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, PLAAF Commander General Chang Dingqiu, Commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy Admiral Nikolay Yevmenov, and Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces General Sergei Surovikin.[37] 

Implications

All told, Admiral Dong’s pathbreaking career has made him one of the PLA’s most experienced joint commanders, with deep expertise at the operational level of war. He has international, joint, and extensive naval experience in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands, the two most important areas of unresolved PRC sovereignty claims, now aggressively pursued under Xi. This familiarity and credibility, together with Dong’s track record and seasoned status as an international interlocutor will be particularly helpful with messaging on PRC strategic goals—the focus of his new position.

The breadth of Dong’s assignments makes him uniquely qualified to serve as Defense Minister where he will represent the PLA at bilateral meetings and high-profile forums on the international stage. His navy and joint operational assignments enhance his ability to articulate and defend PRC’s positions on disputed features in the East and South China Sea and to address PLA operations around the PLA’s most pressing objective: Taiwan.

Taiwan’s 13 January 2024 presidential election and the PLA response—while an Eastern Theater Command responsibility and role—will be one of Dong’s first tests on the international stage. While the nature of any PLA military response to the elections is unknown, Dong will be charged with representing the PLA response to foreign audiences. Through his actions, he will be charged with demonstrating to foreign and domestic audiences alike, the PRC’s unwavering resolve to unify with Taiwan. Given the stakes for all concerned, Dong’s time on center stage will be closely scrutinized. But his navy and joint operational background coupled with foreign engagement prowess suggest he will be well prepared to address this challenge.

Notes

[1] Dr. Erickson is Professor of Strategy at CMSI. CAPT Sharman is Director of CMSI. The views expressed here are theirs alone. They thank Ken Allen, Roderick Lee, Ryan Martinson, and anonymous reviewers for invaluable inputs.

[2] Jiang Chenglong, “China Names Former Navy Commander Dong Jun As New Defense Minister,” China Daily, 29 December 2023,https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202312/29/WS658ea3c6a3105f21a5079c7e.html

[3] As Joel Wuthnow observes, “Most paths to theater and service commander ran through service positions, most notably theater service component commanders. …There was also a new phenomenon of officers being promoted through full-time theater deputy commander positions. This route could offer more exposure to theater joint operations for future senior commanders. Nevertheless, this was a narrow path to promotion: the only examples have been Dong Jun (later promoted to navy commander) and Chang Dingqiu (future air force commander).” Joel Wuthnow, Gray Dragons: Assessing China’s Senior Military Leadership, China Strategic Perspective 16 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 13 September 2022), 29, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china-perspectives-16.pdf.

[4] The PRC MND does not have any operational command responsibilities over the PLA during peacetime or wartime. As such, China’s Defense Minister does not provide operational command over PLA forces while wearing that hat; however, as a concurrent CMC Member, the Defense Minister and the other CMC Members, including the CMC’s two Vice Chairmen, do have operational command of the entire PLA during wartime. Having served as a former Theater Command Navy Commander and concurrent Theater Command Deputy Commander, Dong does bring joint operational command experience to his new billet.

[5] Ying-Yu Lin, “The PLA’s New Generals: Security Implications,” The Diplomat, 28 September 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/the-plas-new-generals-security-implications/.

[6] “我军新军事训练大纲建设主体工程基本完成” [The Main Project of the Construction of Our Military’s New Military Training Outline Has Been Basically Completed], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], 3 January 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-01/03/c_1123942829.htm.

[7] “军事纪实 《军事纪实》 20120504 黄海观澜(下)‘海上联合2012’中俄海军联合演习纪实” [Military Documentary “Military Documentary” 20120504 Yellow Sea Observatory (Part 2) “Maritime Joint 2012” China-Russia Joint Naval Exercise Documentary], 23 June 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JBPSNZA7s7w.

[8] “海军隆重举行将官军衔晋升仪式–吴胜利宣读命令  刘晓江主持” [The Navy Held a Grand Ceremony to Promote Flag Officers in Rank—Wu Shengli Read Orders, Liu Xiaojiang Presided], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 30 July 2012, 1.

[9] As Roderick Lee and Morgan Clemens explain, “The CMC’s establishment of joint theater commands and theater command joint operations command centers has enabled the PLA to reliably plan and command joint operations for the first time. This ability to conduct joint operations is especially useful within the first island chain, given the wide range of forces that the PLA has available to use in the near seas [Yellow, East China, and South China Seas].” Roderick Lee and Morgan Clemens, Organizing to Fight in the Far Seas: The Chinese Navy in an Era of Military Reform, China Maritime Report 9 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, October 2020), 5, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=cmsi-maritime-reports.

[10] Michael Dahm and Alison Zhao, Bitterness Ends, Sweetness Begins: Organizational Changes to the PLAN Submarine Force Since 2015, China Maritime Report 28 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, June 2023), 3, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=cmsi-maritime-reports.

[11] 本报记者王元元 [Reporter Wang Yuanyuan], “海军首长视鼸间989,547护航编队官兵–吴胜利致辞, 苗华主持–杜景臣蒋伟烈刘毅丁毅王登平邱延鹏徐卫兵王建国参加” [Naval Chiefs See Officers and Sailors of Escort Fleets 989 and 547—Wu Shengli Delivered a Speech, Miao Hua Presided—Du Jingshen, Jiang Weilie, Liu Yi, Ding Yi, Wang Dengping, Qiu Yanpeng, Xu Weibing, and Wang Jianguo Attended], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 26 December 2014, 1; 岳菲菲 [Yue Feifei], “解放军多位将领岗位调整 海军至少5人变动职务 张海阳卸任第二炮兵政委” [Many Generals/Admirals in the People’s Liberation Army Change Positions. At Least Five People in the Navy Have Changed Positions. Zhang Haiyang Resigned as Political Commissar of the Second Artillery Force], 北京青年报 [Beijing Youth Daily], 4 January 2015, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0104/c1001-26318074.html; 特约记者沈抒 桕杨 本报记者王智涛 [Special Correspondents Shen Shu and Gao Yang, and Reporter Wang Zhitao], “有一种信念在强化   有一种使命在升腾 —第二期海军学习贯彻全军政治工作会议精神集训班研讨恻记(下 )” [There is a Belief that is Strengthening and a Mission That Is Rising—Commemorative Notes from the Second Training Class for the Navy to Study and Implement the Spirit of the Military Political Work Conference (Part 2)], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 30 March 2015, 1-2; 岳怀让 [Yue Huairang], “董军少将出任驻粤部队领导, 曾任海军副参谋长” [Rear Admiral Dong Jun Takes Position as Leader of Units Stationed in Guangdong Province, Once Took Position as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese Navy ]” 澎湃新闻 [The Paper], 26 January 2017, http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1608805.

[12] 李明波 [Li Mingbo], “海军召开新型智库建设理论研讨会” [Chinese Navy Holds Theory-Based Seminar on Building New-Type Think Tanks], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 19 August 2015, 1.

[13] 赵宝石 [Zhao Baoshi], “王海在海军军事工作上强调在新的起点上推进战斗力建设创新发展” [At Chinese Navy’s Military Work Meeting, Wang Hai Emphasizes Pushing Forward Innovative Development of Combat Power Building at a New Starting Point], 人民海军[People’s Navy], 3 March 2016, 2.

[14] Joint Sea 2015 occurred over nine days in Peter the Great Gulf and the Sea of Japan, then concluded with a joint naval military parade. “Chinese, Russian Navies Complete 9-Day Joint Exercise, Hold Parade,” China Daily, 29 August 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/MilitaryExercises/2015-08/29/content_4616513.htm. For Dong’s involvement therein, see “中俄海军举行大规模立体联合登陆军演” [Chinese and Russian Navies Held a Large-Scale Three-Dimensional Joint Landing Exercise], 中船重工 [China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation], 26 August 2015, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/vlZexMljvI8KGGcOtZB7oQ.

[15] 范江怀、陈国全 [Fan Jianghuai and Chen Guoquan], “中俄‘海上联合-2016’军事演习正式开始” [China-Russia “Joint Sea-2016” Military Exercise Officially Begins], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], 14 September 2016, 3; “【好福利】想知道中俄联合军演的官兵们在干什么吗? 来这里——” [<Good Welfare> Do You Want to Know What the Officers and Soldiers of The Sino-Russian Joint Military Exercise Are Doing? Come Here—], 湛江晚报 [Zhanjiang Evening News], 15 September 2016, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/1WFQNA8OVshnvMGe4lOHmA.

[16] 岳怀让 [Yue Huairang], “董军少将出任驻粤部队领导, 曾任海军副参谋长” [Rear Admiral Dong Jun to Head Guangdong Forces, Formerly Deputy Chief of Staff of Navy], 澎湃新闻 [The Paper], 26 January 2017, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1608805.

[17] Roderick Lee, “The PLA Navy’s ZHANLAN Training Series in 2021: Growing Emphasis on Joint Operations on the High Seas,” 21.9 Jamestown China Brief (7 May 2021), https://jamestown.org/program/the-pla-navys-zhanlan-training-series-in-2021-growing-emphasis-on-joint-operations-on-the-high-seas/.

[18] Ronald O’Rourke, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas: Implications for U.S. Interests—Background and Issues for Congress, R42784 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service,15 November 2023), 18-19, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42784.

[19] Brad Lendon, “China Test Fires So-Called ‘Carrier Killer’ Missiles into South China Sea,” CNN, 29 August 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/28/asia/china-missile-tests-exercises-intl-hnk-scli/index.html; “南海军事演习引发海外关注 专家: 演习区域大参演军兵种多 [South China Sea Military Drills Draw Attention from Overseas—Experts: Large Drill Area, Many Types of Participating Military Forces], 环球时报 [Global Times], 6 August 2021, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2021-08/06/c_1211320206.htm; “China Holds Another Round of Naval Drills in South China Sea,” AP News, https://apnews.com/article/global-trade-asia-pacific-b825dd7a44ac3d4bafae84123af33958.

[20] 蒋子文 [Jiang Ziwen], “海军原副参谋长董军少将出任南部战区副司令员” [Rear Admiral Dong Jun, Former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy, Now Serves as Deputy Commander of the Southern Theater], 澎湃新闻 [The Paper], 27 March 2017, https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1648939.

[21] Li Jiayao, “Chinese defense minister leaves for China-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting in Philippines,” China Military Online, 23 October 2017, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-10/23/content_7796623.htm; Li Jiayao, “Defense Minister Talks Security with ASEAN,” China Military Online, 24 October 2017, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-10/24/content_7797926.htm.

[22] “‘海洋卫士-2020’中巴海上联合演习闭幕” [China-Pakistan Joint Maritime Exercise “Sea Guardians 2020” Concludes], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], 15 January 2020; Dong Zhaohui, “Sea Guardians 2020 China-Pakistan Joint Naval Exercise Wraps Up in Karachi,” China Military Online, 14 January 2020, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/4858549.html;

[23] Xi Presents Orders to Promote Military Officers to Rank of General,” Xinhua, 6 September 2021,http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202109/06/WS6136147aa310efa1bd66daee.html.

[24] Wang Xinjuan, “China Unveils Giant Aircraft Carrier CNS Fujian,” China Daily, 18 June 2022, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/10164161.html?&tsrcfedwzhl.

[25] Ryan D. Martinson, “Winning High-End War at Sea: Insights into the PLA Navy’s New Strategic Concept,” Center for International Maritime Security, 18 May 2023, https://cimsec.org/winning-high-end-war-at-sea-insights-into-the-pla-navys-new-strategic-concept/.

[26] 刘峰记者牛涛 王汉 [Liu Feng and Reporters Niu Tao and Wang Han], “深入贯彻习近平强军思想 贯彻新时代人才强军版略, 畜力开创海军人才建设高质量发展新局面–海军人才工作会议在京召开 海军司令员董军、政治委员袁华智出席并讲话” [Deeply Implement Xi Jinping’s Thought on Strengthening the Military, Implement the Strategy of Strengthening the Military through Talents in the New Era, and Create a New Situation for the High-Quality Development of Naval personnel. The Navy Talents Work Conference Was held in Beijing. Navy Commander Dong Jun and Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi Attended and Delivered Speeches], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 23 September 2022, 1.

[27] 孙前前 记者王力飞 [Sun Qianqian and Reporter Wang Lifei], “海军党委视频慰问海上海外、新域新质、跨区驻训任务部队和驻高山海岛部队–向海军各级指战员仪心切问候和新春祝福 [The Navy Party Committee Paid Its Condolences via Video to Troops Stationed Overseas, In New Domains and With New Qualities, And on Cross-Regional Training Missions, As Well As Troops Stationed on High Mountains and Islands. Heartfelt Greetings and New Year’s Blessings to Naval Commanders and Personnel at All Levels], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], 13 January 2023, 1.

[28] “中央军委晋升上将军衔仪式/习近平颁发命令状并表示祝贺” [Central Military Commission Promotion Ceremony to the Rank of General/Admiral—Xi Jinping Issues Certificate of Command and Expresses Congratulations], 华人风采CN [Chinese Style CN], https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5aU8F46NRII.

[29] “[视频]吴胜利会见瑞典海军检查长扬·托恩奎斯特” [[Video] Wu Shengli Meets with Swedish Navy Inspector General Jan Törnqvist], CCTV-7国防军事频道 [CCTV-7 National Defense Military Channel], 4 November 2011, https://tv.cctv.com/2011/11/04/VIDE1351150218491838.shtml.

[30] “[视频]吴胜利会见吉布提海军司令” [[Video] Wu Shengli Meets with Djibouti Navy Commander], CCTV-7国防军事频道 [CCTV-7 National Defense Military Channel], 8 July 2011, https://tv.cctv.com/2011/07/08/VIDE1351150059058191.shtml.

[31] “[视频]吴胜利会见英国海军参谋长” [[Video] Wu Shengli Meets with the British Chief of the Naval Staff], CCTV-7国防军事频道[CCTV-7 National Defense Military Channel], 11 July 2011, https://tv.cctv.com/2011/07/11/VIDE1351150063558551.shtml.

[32] “[视频]吴胜利会见朝鲜海军副司令CCTV-7国防军事频道” [[Video] Wu Shengli Meets with the Deputy Commander of the North Korean Navy], CCTV-7国防军事频道 [CCTV-7 National Defense Military Channel], 20 September 2011, https://tv.cctv.com/2011/09/20/VIDE1351150194690640.shtml.

[33] “吴胜利会见智利海军司令” [Wu Shengli Meets with Chilean Navy Commander], CCTV-7国防军事频道 [CCTV-7 National Defense Military Channel], 7 June 2011, https://tv.cctv.com/2011/06/07/VIDE1351150016673515.shtml.

[34] “Chief of Navy RADM Wat Makes Introductory Visit to China,” Singapore Ministry of Defence, 11 September 2023, https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/navy/pressroom/articles/2023/11sep23_article.

[35] “Navies of China, Gulf of Guinea Countries Discuss Maritime Security,” PRC State Council Information Office, 27 May 2022, http://english.scio.gov.cn/pressroom/2022-05/27/content_78239826.htm.

[36] See, for example, “中俄两国国防部长举行视频通话” [Russian and Chinese Defense Ministers Hold Video Call], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], 24 November 2021, 1, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/4899464.html.

[37] Li Jiayao, “Chinese, Russian Defense Ministers Hold Talks via Video Link,” China Military Online, 23 November 2021, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2021-11/23/content_10110231.htm.

***

Christopher H. Sharman and Andrew S. Erickson, “Admiral Hu to the Helm: China’s New Navy Commander Brings Operational Expertise,” CMSI Note 1 (Newport, RI: Naval War College China Maritime Studies Institute, 27 December 2023).

• Republished in The Maritime Executive. Click here to listen to this 13:16 “Top Story.”
• Quoted by Radio Free Asia.

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